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GIVING UP THE GHOST:
A PROPOSAL FOR DEALING WITH
ATTORNEY “GHOSTWRITING” OF PRO SE
LITIGANTS’ COURT DOCUMENTS
THROUGH EXPLICIT RULES REQUIRING
DISCLOSURE AND ALLOWING LIMITED
APPEARANCES FOR SUCH ATTORNEYS
MICHAEL W. LOUDENSLAGER
More and more pro se litigants are making their way to the courthouse. Pro se litigants have
become common, especially in state housing and family law courts and in federal bankruptcy court.
In response, a growing number of attorneys have started providing unbundled or limited scope legal
services to these litigants. This involves a client hiring an attorney to perform a discrete task in a
lawsuit and nothing else. One particular form of discrete task legal services involves attorney
“ghostwriting.” In such arrangements, an attorney drafts pleadings or other court documents for
pro se litigants. However, the legal assistance that the client received goes unacknowledged, and the
attorney remains unnamed on the documents when filed with the court. The pro se litigant then goes
on to conduct the litigation on his or her own.
However, court opinions resoundingly have condemned this conduct.

Meanwhile, ethics

opinions dealing with the issue largely have instructed attorneys to disclose at least the nature of the
assistance provided to the litigant, if not the attorney’s actual identity. Nevertheless, the ethics
opinions in some jurisdictions have approved of this activity, and some commentators continue to
advocate for attorney ghostwriting.
Even so, courts and the legal bar should not sacrifice attorneys’ ethical duties in a desperate
attempt to deal with the rising tide of pro se litigants by formally acknowledging and acquiescing to
undisclosed attorney ghostwriting of court documents for pro se litigants. Instead, this Article
concludes that the duty that an attorney owes to a court to be truthful and candid, to avoid dishonest
behavior generally, and to certify the legitimacy of the facts and legal arguments contained in court
documents ultimately prohibits ghostwriting.

Therefore, courts should require an attorney to

acknowledge the drafting assistance that he or she has provided to the client and to reveal the
attorney’s identity on the pro se litigant’s court documents concerned.
At the same time, such participation should qualify only as a limited appearance, and express
rules should exist affirming this. Otherwise, attorneys will be reluctant to provide limited legal
services to pro se litigants due to the fear that a court will determine such activity constitutes making
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a general appearance in the litigation and will keep attorneys “on the hook” for representing the
client throughout the entire lawsuit. Only by enacting both of these reforms can jurisdictions hold
attorneys to the important duties owed to both the court system and third parties while
simultaneously encouraging attorneys to provide limited legal services to pro se litigants.
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I. INTRODUCTION
More and more pro se litigants are making their way to the courthouse. 1
Readers envisioning hordes of vexatious, unrepresented parties suing
everybody from executive department officials to legislators to judges to
1. See infra Part II (discussing growth of pro se litigation).
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opposing attorneys (to the mothers of each of these individuals) for a
perceived unjust result in prior litigation or some other perceived wrong
should reconsider. For various reasons, 2 pro se litigants dealing with
ordinary, everyday legal issues have become common in state housing and
family law courts and in federal bankruptcy court, among other venues. 3 In
response, a growing number of attorneys have started providing unbundled or
limited scope legal services.4 This involves a client hiring an attorney to
perform a discrete task in a lawsuit, but otherwise the client conducts the
litigation on his or her own. 5 One particular form of discrete task legal
2. A debate exists concerning whether the rise in pro se litigants has arisen simply due to
individuals of low and moderate income being unable to afford full-service legal representation, see
infra notes 19–21 and accompanying text (discussing the unmet demand for legal services from those
of low to moderate means), or whether pro se litigants more predominantly go unrepresented due to
personal preference and despite being able to afford full legal representation, see infra notes 26–28
and accompanying text (discussing reasons other than finances that some litigants may choose to
proceed unrepresented in court proceedings).
3. See infra notes 25–27 and accompanying text.
4. Margaret Graham Tebo, Scary Parts of Ghostwriting, A.B.A. J., Aug. 2007, at 16.
5. See Rochelle Klempner, Unbundled Legal Services in New York State Litigated Matters: A
Proposal to Test the Efficacy Through Law School Clinics, 30 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 653,
654 (2006) (―Unbundled legal services, also described as ‗discrete task representation‘ or ‗limited
scope legal assistance,‘ is a practice in which the lawyer and client agree that the lawyer will provide
some, but not all, of the work involved in traditional full-service representation. Simply put, the
lawyers perform[] only the agreed upon tasks, rather than the whole ‗bundle,‘ and the clients perform
the remaining tasks on their own.‖); Tebo, supra note 4, at 16 (describing ―unbundling‖ as ―lawyers
agree[ing] to be responsible for only carefully delineated portions of a client‘s case‖); John C.
Rothermich, Note, Ethical and Procedural Implications of “Ghostwriting” for Pro Se Litigants:
Toward Increased Access to Civil Justice, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2687, 2691 (1999) (―According to
the unbundled model, lawyers provide a prospective client with a choice of assistance from a list of
discrete legal tasks, instead of the traditional full-service package.‖).
The ABA Standing Committee on the Delivery of Legal Services provided the following
medical services analogy to help explain potential clients‘ ―continuum of need‖ for unbundled legal
services:
A person with a headache is not encouraged to begin his or her response to that
pain with an appointment with a brain surgeon. Instead, people will use selfhelp methods to become educated on the range of services and products
available for pain relief. The first professional consulted is more likely to be a
pharmacist, for a recommendation for over-the-counter medication. When the
problem persists, people may then go to their personal physician. In a few
cases, that doctor will refer the patient to a specialist. Similarly, in a complex
society with pervasive legal implications to everyday transactions, the
continuum of legal services suggests that most legal matters are handled
through self-help. Occasionally, people have a need for legal assistance, and as
matters move through the continuum, some will have the need for the
representation of a lawyer.
ABA STANDING COMM. ON THE DELIVERY OF LEGAL SERVS., REPORT ON THE PUBLIC HEARING ON
ACCESS
TO
JUSTICE
4
(2003),
available
at
http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/downloads/delivery/reportpublichearingonaccesstojustice.pdf
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services involves attorney ―ghostwriting.‖ In such arrangements, an attorney
drafts pleadings or other court documents for pro se litigants, but the legal
assistance that the client receives goes unacknowledged and the attorney
remains unnamed on the documents themselves when the pro se litigant files
them with the court.6 The pro se litigant then goes on to conduct the litigation
or argue the motion concerned on his or her own.
However, court opinions have resoundingly condemned ghostwriting. 7
Meanwhile, ethics opinions dealing with the issue largely have instructed
attorneys to disclose at least the nature of the assistance provided to the
litigant, if not the attorney‘s actual identity. 8 Nevertheless, the ethics opinions
in some jurisdictions have approved of this activity, and some commentators
continue to advocate for courts to allow attorney ghostwriting. 9
Even so, courts should not sacrifice attorneys‘ ethical duties out of
desperation in order to deal with the rising tide of pro se litigants and
acquiesce in undisclosed attorney ghostwriting of court documents for pro se
litigants. Instead, this Article concludes the duty that an attorney owes to a
court to be truthful and candid, 10 to avoid dishonest behavior generally, 11 and
to certify the legitimacy of the facts and legal arguments contained in court
documents,12 implicitly prohibits this practice. However, courts should be
more explicit in requiring attorneys to acknowledge the drafting assistance
that they have provided to clients and to reveal the attorney‘s identity on the
pro se litigant‘s court documents concerned.13 At the same time, courts
should promulgate rules that allow such participation to qualify as only a
limited appearance, or no appearance at all, and refrain from compelling such
attorneys to provide services beyond those the client originally contracted
from the attorney.14 Otherwise, attorneys will be reluctant to provide limited
legal services to litigants otherwise proceeding pro se. By enacting both of
[hereinafter ABA HEARING REPORT].
6. See Klempner, supra note 5, at 658 (―The practice whereby attorneys draft court documents
for clients who represent themselves in court, where the court papers do not reveal that an attorney
assisted in their preparation, is known as ‗ghostwriting.‘‖); Tebo, supra note 4, at 16 (describing
―ghostwriting‖ as where ―a lawyer drafts court papers for a client but does not enter an official
appearance in the case‖); Rothermich, supra note 5, at 2692 (―One particular form of limited legal
assistance, known as ‗ghostwriting,‘ consists of the drafting of pleadings and other court documents
by attorneys for clients who go on to represent themselves in court pro se. . . . The documents are
then filed by the litigant herself, and the attorney has no further involvement with the case.‖).
7. See infra Part IV.A.
8. See infra Part IV.B.3.
9. See infra Part IV.B.3.c.
10. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(1) (2002).
11. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 8.4(c) (2002).
12. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b).
13. See infra Part V.
14. See infra Part V.
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these reforms, courts can hold attorneys to the important duties owed to the
court system while simultaneously encouraging attorneys to provide limited
legal services to pro se litigants.
In reaching this conclusion, Part II of this Article examines the relatively
recent growth in the number of pro se litigants and discusses some of the
possible causes of this phenomenon. Part III presents the main ethics rules
that attorney ghostwriting potentially violates. Part IV considers the reaction
of the courts, various ethics committees, and commentators to attorney
ghostwriting of pro se litigants‘ court documents. Part V then presents
recommendations for dealing with attorney ghostwriting and the policy
rationales supporting these recommendations.
II. GROWTH OF PRO SE LITIGATION
Courts, especially those dealing with housing, family, and bankruptcy
matters, have experienced significant growth in the number of pro se litigants
appearing before them in recent years.15 In fact, the majority of litigants in
these types of cases now proceed pro se without the use of an attorney. 16
Moreover, as many as eighty percent of these matters involve pro se litigants
in some jurisdictions. 17 An American Bar Association (ABA) task force has
noted that ―[n]ationally, in three or four out of every five [family law] cases,
one of the two parties is unrepresented‖ and that ―both parties are
unrepresented in two or three out of every five cases.‖18
One explanation for this increase in parties proceeding pro se is that
people of low to middle income levels simply cannot afford an attorney to
represent them. 19 For example, two-thirds of respondents to one survey
15. DEBORAH L. RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE 14 (2004); Handbook on Limited Scope Legal
Assistance: A Report of the Modest Means Task Force, 2003 A.B.A. SEC. LITIG. 8 [hereinafter
Modest Means Task Force].
16. RHODE, supra note 15, at 14; see also Drew A. Swank, In Defense of Rules and Roles: The
Need to Curb Extreme Forms of Pro Se Assistance and Accommodation in Litigation, 54 AM. U. L.
REV. 1537, 1539 (2005) (―[I]n some state courts—those that handle traffic, landlord/tenant, and child
support or other domestic relations issues, the number of cases in which at least one side is pro se far
outnumber those in which counsel represent both parties.‖); Brenda Star Adams, Note, “Unbundled
Legal Services”: A Solution to the Problems Caused by Pro Se Litigation in Massachusetts’s Civil
Courts, 40 NEW ENG. L. REV. 303, 314 (2005) (―A 1997 study of pro se litigation in Probate and
Family Court in twelve Massachusetts counties found that more than two-thirds of all cases included
at least one pro se litigant.‖).
17. RHODE, supra note 15, at 14; see also Swank, supra note 16, at 1539 (―In many of these
courts, eighty to ninety percent of cases involve at least one pro se litigant.‖); Adams, supra note 16,
at 314 (noting a ―1997 study of the Northeast Housing Court found that seventy-nine percent of
litigants appeared without counsel‖).
18. Modest Means Task Force, supra note 15, at 8.
19. See ABA HEARING REPORT, supra note 5, at 4 (―Substantial evidence indicates the
existence of a latent marketplace for personal civil legal services to those of low and moderate
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―agree[d] that it [was] ‗not affordable to bring a case to court.‘‖ 20 According
to one survey conducted in Maryland, three-quarters of people of middle
income do not contact an attorney when they have a legal problem. 21
Furthermore, this lack of representation likely increases litigants‘
dissatisfaction with the legal system. One survey indicated that up to seventyfive percent of people who had a legal need but did not retain an attorney
were dissatisfied with the outcome in their matter.22 Another survey indicated
that only about one-half of people of middle income were happy with the
result when proceeding pro se. 23 This contrasts with the satisfaction that
people who obtain legal representation experience with the judicial system.
One survey‘s results indicated that two-thirds of people who retained counsel
to deal with their legal problems were satisfied with the outcome. 24
One commentator, though, has expressed reasons for the growth in pro se
litigants other than the lack of affordable legal services. Drew Swank has
asserted that the growth in pro se litigants exemplifies predominantly a
preference for ―doing-it-yourself‖ that results from several factors, including a
distrust of attorneys and the legal system, an ―increased sense of
consumerism,‖ and an increase in availability of forms and other assistance
for pro se litigants.25 Swank even contends that some people may proceed pro
se ―as a trial strategy designed to gain either sympathy or a procedural
incomes.‖); WILLIAM HORNSBY, IMPROVING THE DELIVERY OF AFFORDABLE LEGAL SERVICES
THROUGH THE INTERNET : A BLUEPRINT FOR THE SHIFT TO A DIGITAL P ARADIGM 3 (1999),
available at http://www.unbundledlaw.org/program/11%20-%20Lawyering%20over%20web%20%20hornsby.pdf (―[Fifty-seven] percent of pro se litigants [in Maryland] proceeded pro se because
they could not afford a lawyer.‖); Tebo, supra note 4, at 17 (quoting James McCauley, ethics counsel
for the Virginia State Bar, as stating that ―the people most likely to seek unbundled services tend to
do so solely for financial reasons‖); Adams, supra note 16, at 304 (―[T]he majority of pro se litigants
[represent themselves] because they cannot afford a lawyer.‖); Cristina L. Underwood, Comment,
Balancing Consumer Interests in a Digital Age: A New Approach to Regulating the Unauthorized
Practice of Law, 79 WASH. L. REV. 437, 442 (2004) (―Many low- and moderate-income households
simply cannot afford the cost of personal legal services.‖); see also Rothermich, supra note 5, at
2688 (―[I]t is estimated that legal services organizations were forced to deny over half of their
eligible clients any assistance due to inadequate resources.‖).
20. RHODE, supra note 15, at 80.
21. Id. at 79; see also Rothermich, supra note 5, at 2688 (―[L]ow income households‘ legal
problems involved the judicial system only twenty-nine percent of the time‖ and ―[f]or legal
problems of households defined as moderate-income, and thus categorically ineligible for most free
legal services, the judicial system was involved only thirty-nine percent of the time.‖).
22. Modest Means Task Force, supra note 15, at 14 n.30 (citing the results of an Oregon
survey).
23. RHODE, supra note 15, at 80.
24. Id.
25. Swank, supra note 16, at 1574–75 (listing twelve factors leading to the such growth); see
also Jona Goldschmidt, In Defense of Ghostwriting, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1145, 1145 (2002)
(―[T]he growth of pro se litigation . . . can be attributed to the high cost of litigation, anti-lawyer
sentiment, and the advent of do-it-yourself law kits, books, and web sites.‖).
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advantage over represented parties.‖ 26 Swank further notes that ―[u]ltimately
it may be the simplicity of the cases and the nature of the jurisdiction [in
terms of the availability of certain types of non-traditional legal assistance for
the type of matter concerned], more than the characteristics of the litigants,
that determines whether individuals represent[] themselves or not.‖ 27
Regardless of the true cause of the rise in pro se litigants in our courts, be
it lack of affordability of legal services or a conscious choice by litigants who
can afford legal representation, this phenomenon is extensive enough to merit
a response from attorneys and courts. The rest of this Article deals with the
appropriateness of one reaction to this phenomenon—attorney ghostwriting of
court documents—and provides some recommendations for dealing with this
activity.
III. ETHICS RULES THAT GHOSTWRITING IMPLICATES
The current version of Model Rule 1.2(c) expressly allows for the
provision of limited scope legal services as long as ―the limitation is
reasonable under the circumstances and the client gives informed consent.‖28
However, Rule 1.2(c) does not address attorney ghostwriting. Several other
ethics rules are potentially applicable to attorney ghostwriting of nominal pro
se litigants‘ court documents. While none expressly forbid such conduct,
these rules can serve as the basis for concluding that attorney ghostwriting of
documents without disclosure to the court is prohibited ethically.
A. Model Rule 3.3: “Candor Toward the Tribunal”
One of the most applicable rules is Model Rule 3.3, entitled ―Candor
Toward the Tribunal.‖29 Section (a) of this rule states that ―[a] lawyer shall
not knowingly: (1) make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to
correct a false statement of material fact or law previously made to the
tribunal by the lawyer.‖30 Section (b) of Rule 3.3 goes on to state that an
attorney representing a client in ―an adjudicative proceeding . . . who knows
that a person intends to engage, is engaging or has engaged in criminal or
fraudulent conduct related to the proceeding shall take reasonable remedial
measures, including, if necessary, disclosure to the tribunal.‖31 The rule goes
on to state that these duties ―apply even if compliance requires disclosure of

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Swank, supra note 16, at 1575.
Id. at 1575–76.
MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.2(c) (2002).
MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (2002).
MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(1) (2002).
MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 3.3(b) (2002).
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information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6,‖32 which deals with protection
of confidential information. Furthermore, a comment to Rule 3.3 states that
―[t]here are circumstances where failure to make a disclosure is the equivalent
of an affirmative misrepresentation.‖33
Another comment points out that the purpose of the rule is for attorneys
―to avoid conduct that undermines the integrity of the adjudicative process.‖ 34
Thus, the key to whether attorney ghostwriting of court documents for
nominal pro se litigants without disclosure violates this rule appears to be
whether such conduct ―undermines the integrity of the adjudicative
process.‖35 However, in discussing attorneys‘ ―obligation to protect a tribunal
against criminal or fraudulent conduct that undermines the integrity of the
adjudicative process,‖ the comment discusses activity ―such as bribing,
intimidating or otherwise unlawfully communicating with a witness, juror,
court official or other participant in the proceeding, unlawfully destroying or
concealing documents or other evidence or failing to disclose information to
the tribunal when required by law to do so.‖ 36 The mentioned activity seems
more severe than ghostwriting of documents for pro se litigants, but the
comment does not provide an exhaustive list of conduct that would affect the
integrity of the judicial process.
B. Rules Generally Proscribing Involvement in Fraud on the Part of
Attorneys
Although Model Rule 3.3 directly addresses representations made to the
court and protecting the integrity of the judicial system, several rules more
generally proscribe an attorney from participating in fraudulent activity.
Model Rule 8.4, entitled ―Misconduct,‖ states that ―[i]t is professional
misconduct for a lawyer to: . . . (c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty,
fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.‖37 Similarly, Model Rule 4.1, entitled
―Truthfulness in Statements to Others,‖ provides:
32. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 3.3(c) (2002). The nearest Model Code of
Professional Responsibility equivalent was DR 7-102(A)(5), entitled ―Representing a Client Within
the Bounds of Law,‖ which stated, ―In his representation of a client, a lawyer shall
not . . . [k]nowingly make a false statement of law or fact.‖
MODEL CODE OF PROF‘L
RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(5) (1980).
33. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 3 (2002).
34. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 2 (2002).
35. Id.
36. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 12 (2002). The comment is consistent
with the standard definition of ―fraud on the court,‖ which is ―[a] scheme to interfere with judicial
machinery performing [the] task of impartial adjudication‖ and which usually requires egregious
conduct, ―such as bribery of a judge or jury,‖ that ―undermines the integrity of the judicial process.‖
BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 661 (6th ed. 1990).
37. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 8.4(c) (2002). This language is very similar to DR
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In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not
knowingly:
(a) make a false statement of material fact or law to a third
person; or
(b) fail to disclose a material fact when disclosure is
necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a
client, unless disclosure is prohibited by Rule 1.6.38
Moreover, Model Rule 1.2(d) prohibits an attorney from ―counsel[ing] a
client to engage, or assist[ing] a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is
criminal or fraudulent.‖39 A comment to Rule 1.2 provides that a ―lawyer is
required to avoid assisting the client, for example, by drafting or delivering
documents that the lawyer knows are fraudulent or by suggesting how the
wrongdoing might be concealed.‖40 Furthermore, a comment to Model Rule
3.3 notes that the obligation set out in Rule 1.2(d) ―applies in litigation.‖ 41
Finally, Model Rule 1.6, dealing with an attorney‘s duty of confidentiality,
allows disclosure of confidential information in order to prevent or remedy
client fraud related to the attorney‘s provision of legal services to that client. 42
Therefore, not only is an attorney prohibited from making misrepresentations
to the court, but attorneys are prohibited generally from acting fraudulently or
from assisting others to act in this manner. Additionally, an attorney can
disclose confidential information in order to prevent, mitigate, or remedy
instances of fraud that are imminent or have in fact occurred.
C. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b)
Beyond the ethics rules that govern attorney conduct, Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 11(b) may be applicable to attorneys who ghostwrite
documents for pro se litigants without disclosure. Rule 11(b) states that ―[b]y
1-102(A)(4) of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, also entitled ―Misconduct,‖ which
stated, ―(A) A lawyer shall not: . . . (4) Engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation.‖ MODEL CODE OF PROF‘L RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102(A)(4) (1980).
38. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 4.1 (2002).
39. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2002).
40. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) cmt. 10 (2002).
41. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 3 (2002).
42. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(2), (3) (2003) (―A lawyer may reveal‖
confidential client information ―to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary . . . to prevent
the client from committing a crime or fraud that is reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to
the financial interests or property of another and in furtherance of which the client has used or is
using the lawyer‘s services‖ or ―to prevent, mitigate or rectify substantial injury to the financial
interests or property of another that is reasonably certain to result or has resulted from the client‘s
commission of a crime or fraud in furtherance of which the client has used the lawyer‘s services.‖).
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presenting to the court a pleading, written motion, or other paper . . . an
attorney . . . certifies that to the best of the [attorney‘s] knowledge,
information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the
circumstances‖ that the document is not ―being presented for any improper
purpose,‖ that ―the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted
by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for . . . establishing new law‖
and that ―the factual contentions have evidentiary support.‖43 As set out
below, several courts have held that attorneys who ghostwrite court
documents for nominal pro se litigants improperly avoid this obligation under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b) to certify that a reasonable basis exists
for both the facts and legal arguments presented in the document concerned. 44
IV. LEGAL AUTHORITY DIRECTLY ADDRESSING ATTORNEY GHOSTWRITING
OF COURT DOCUMENTS
Although the various ethics rules that govern attorney conduct do not
directly address the propriety of attorney ghostwriting of documents for a
nominal pro se litigant, several cases and state and local ethics opinions have
explicitly dealt with the issue. Courts have overwhelmingly condemned
attorney ghostwriting of court documents. 45 The ABA, though, recently
changed its official stance on the issue. 46 While an earlier ABA ethics
opinion required disclosure, 47 a recent opinion concluded that attorney
ghostwriting of documents for litigants holding themselves out to the court as
pro se is appropriate and does not require disclosure. 48 Nevertheless, the
majority of the state and local ethics committees that have addressed the issue
have called for disclosure to the court when attorneys draft pleadings or briefs
for pro se parties.49 However, there is some disagreement as to the extent of
the disclosure that needs to be made, with some ethics committees requiring
that the attorney only disclose that ghostwriting has occurred, while others
additionally require that the attorney disclose his or her identity to the court. 50
There also is some disagreement as to how extensively the attorney must aid
the pro se litigant before disclosure of any kind needs to be made. 51 Despite
43. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b). This Article refers to the version of Rule 11 in effect prior to
December 1, 2007.
44. See infra Part IV.A.2 (discussing case law applying certifications of Rule 11 to attorney
ghostwriting).
45. See infra Part IV.A.
46. See infra Part IV.B.1–2.
47. See infra Part IV.B.1.
48. See infra Part IV.B.2.
49. See infra Part IV.B.3.
50. See infra Part IV.B.3.a–b.
51. See infra notes 123–24, 136–38, 141–42 and accompanying text.

2008]

GIVING UP THE GHOST

113

the large amount of authority concluding that ethics rules prohibit attorney
ghostwriting, some commentators continue to advocate against requiring any
type of attorney disclosure of such activity and raise novel arguments
supporting this stance.52
A. Condemnation by the Courts
The overwhelming majority of courts to address the issue have prohibited
attorneys from engaging in the undisclosed ghostwriting of court documents
for otherwise pro se litigants. 53 Courts have used four main policy rationales
for coming to this conclusion, which are set out below.
1. Undisclosed Ghostwriting Involves a Misrepresentation to the Court and
Provides the Nominal Pro Se Litigant with an Unfair Advantage
Several courts have held that attorneys who ghostwrite court documents
for pro se litigants without disclosing this conduct to the court make a
misrepresentation to the court54 and violate applicable attorney ethics rules. 55
52. See infra Part IV.C.
53. See infra Part IV.A.1–4.
54. Barnett v. LeMaster, 12 F. App‘x 774, 778–79 (10th Cir. 2001) (stating that where the party
―entered a pro se appearance as well as filed and signed his appeal pro se, the attorney who drafted
the brief knowingly committed a gross misrepresentation to this court‖); Duran v. Carris, 238 F.3d
1268, 1272 (10th Cir. 2001) (determining that attorney ghostwriting of pro se litigant‘s appellate
brief ―constitute[d] a misrepresentation to this court by litigant and attorney‖); Laremont-Lopez v.
Se. Tidewater Opportunity Ctr., 968 F. Supp. 1075, 1078 (E.D. Va. 1997) (finding that attorney
ghostwriting of pro se litigants‘ complaints ―constitute[d] a misrepresentation to the Court‖); United
States v. Eleven Vehicles, 966 F. Supp. 361, 367 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (―Clearly, the party‘s representation
to the Court that he is pro se is not true when the pleadings are being prepared by the lawyer. A
lawyer should not silently acquiesce to such representation.‖); In re Mungo, 305 B.R. 762, 769
(Bankr. D.S.C. 2003) (―[T]his Court prohibits attorneys from ghost-writing pleadings and motions
for litigants that appear pro se because such an act is a misrepresentation that violates an attorney‘s
duty and professional responsibility to provide the utmost candor toward the Court.‖); see also
Johnson v. Bd. of County Comm‘rs, 868 F. Supp. 1226, 1232 (D. Colo. 1994) (―Having a lit igant
appear to be pro se when in truth an attorney is authoring pleadings and necessarily guiding the
course of the litigation with an unseen hand . . . is far below the level of candor which must be met
by members of the bar.‖), aff’d, 85 F.3d 489 (10th Cir. 1995); In re Merriam, 250 B.R. 724, 733
(Bankr. D. Colo. 2000) (finding that attorney ghostwriting of pro se litigant‘s court documents
violates the attorney‘s ―duty of honesty and candor to the court‖).
55. Anderson v. Duke Energy Corp., No. 3:06cv399, 2007 WL 4284904, at *1 n.1 (W.D.N.C.
Dec. 4, 2007) (―The practice of ‗ghostwriting‘ by an attorney for a party who otherwise professes to
be pro se is disfavored and considered by many courts to be unethical.‖); Delso v. Trs. for
Retirement Plan for Hourly Employees of Merck & Co., No. 04-3009, 2007 WL 766349, at *17
(D.N.J. Mar. 6, 2007) (finding that ghostwriting attorney‘s ―failure to affirmatively advise the Court
of his informal assistance of [the nominal pro se litigant], and [that litigant‘s] subsequent submission
to the Court under her own signature was not emblematic of the candid honesty contemplated by
[New Jersey‘s] RPC 3.3‖); Ostevoll v. Ostevoll, No. C-1-99-961, 2000 WL 1611123, at *9 (S.D.
Ohio Aug. 16, 2000) (―Ghostwriting of legal documents by attorneys on behalf of litigants who state
that they are proceeding pro se has been held to be inconsistent with the intent of procedural, ethical
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The main rationale for this conclusion is that this conduct provides pro se
litigants with an unfair advantage against their opponent because courts are
more forgiving when interpreting pro se parties‘ court documents and when
applying its procedural rules to pro se litigants. 56
It is well established that a court must construe pro se litigants‘ documents
more liberally than it would otherwise if legal counsel for a party had drafted
the documents.57 This rule applies not only during the initial stages of the
and substantive rules of the Court.‖); Eleven Vehicles, 966 F. Supp. at 367 (―[P]articipating in a ghost
writing arrangement such as this, where the lawyer drafts the pleadings and the party signs them,
implicates the lawyer‘s duty of candor to the Court.‖); Johnson, 868 F. Supp. at 1232 (finding that
attorney ghostwriting ―will not be countenanced because it is contrary to Colorado Rule of
Professional Conduct 1.2(d) which provides ‗[a] lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist
a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent‘‖); In re Mungo, 305 B.R. at 770
(―The act of ghost-writing violates SCRPC Rule 3.3(a)(2) and SCRPC Rule 8.4(d) because assisting
a litigant to appear pro se when in truth an attorney is authoring pleadings and necessarily managing
the course of the litigation while cloaked in anonymity is plainly deceitful, dishonest, and far below
the level of disclosure and candor this Court expects from members of the bar.‖).
56. See Delso, 2007 WL 766349, at *13 (―Simply stated, courts often act as referees charged
with ensuring a fair fight. This becomes an obvious problem when the Court is giving extra latitude
to a purported pro se litigant who is receiving secret professional help.‖); Laremont-Lopez, 968 F.
Supp. at 1078 (―When, however, complaints drafted by attorneys are filed bearing the signature of a
plaintiff outwardly proceeding pro se . . . [t]he pro se plaintiff enjoys the benefit of the legal counsel
while also being subjected to the less stringent standard reserved for those proceeding without the
benefit of counsel. This situation places the opposing party at an unfair disadvantage, [and]
interferes with the efficient administration of justice . . . .‖); Johnson, 868 F. Supp. at 1231 (stating
that the pro se litigant‘s ―pleadings seemingly filed pro se but drafted by an attorney would give him
the unwarranted advantage of having a liberal pleading standard applied whilst holding the plaintiffs
to a more demanding scrutiny‖ and that ―[t]he entire process would be skewed to the distinct
disadvantage of the nonoffending party‖); In re Mungo, 305 B.R. at 769 (―[F]ederal courts generally
interpret pro se documents liberally and afford greater latitude as a matter of judicial discretion.
Allowing a pro se litigant to receive such latitude in addition to assistance from an attorney would
disadvantage the non-offending party.‖); In re Merriam, 250 B.R. at 733 (―When an attorney has the
client sign a pleading that the attorney prepared, the attorney creates the impression that the client
drafted the pleading. . . . [T]he situation ‗places the opposing party at an unfair disadvantage‘ and
‗interferes with the efficient administration of justice.‘‖); see also Klein v. H. N. Whitney, Goadby &
Co., 341 F. Supp. 699, 702 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (―[E]njoying the assistance of a lawyer or lawyers who
have not formally appeared in this case . . . is grossly unfair to both this court and the opposing
lawyers and should not be countenanced.‖); Rothermich, supra note 5, at 2697 (―[I]f courts
mistakenly believe that the ghostwritten pleading was drafted without legal assistance, they might
apply an unwarranted degree of leniency to a pleading that was actually drafted with the assistance of
counsel.‖).
57. See Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 15 (1980) (―An unrepresented litigant should not be
punished for his failure to recognize subtle factual or legal deficiencies in his claims.‖); Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (―The handwritten pro se document is to be liberally construed.‖);
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (stating that the Supreme Court holds a pro se litigant‘s
complaint ―to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers‖); see also Burgos v.
Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787, 790 (2d Cir. 1994) (―Because Burgos is a pro se litigant, we read his
supporting papers liberally, and will interpret them to raise the strongest arguments that they
suggest.‖); Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep‘t, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988) (―In civil
rights cases where the plaintiff appears pro se, the court must construe the pleadings liberally and
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litigation pursuant to a motion to dismiss, but throughout the course of the
lawsuit, including the summary judgment stage. 58 Furthermore, courts will
provide pro se litigants with more leeway in meeting procedural deadlines 59

must afford plaintiff the benefit of any doubt.‖); Bates v. Jean, 745 F.2d 1146, 1150 (7th Cir. 1984)
(―Pro se litigants are commonly required to comply with standards less stringent than those applied
to expertly trained members of the legal profession.‖).
―[T]his rule means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on
which the plaintiff could prevail, it should do so despite the plaintiff‘s failure to cite proper legal
authority, his confusion of various legal theories, his poor syntax and sentence construction, or his
unfamiliarity with pleading requirements.‖ Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991).
However, there is a limit to the amount of leeway that courts will provide to the documents of pro se
litigants. For example, courts are not supposed to ―construct arguments or theories for the [litigant]
in the absence of any discussion of those issues,‖ Whayne v. Kansas, 980 F. Supp. 387, 393 (D. Kan.
1997) (quoting Drake v. City of Fort Collins, 927 F.2d 1156, 1159 (10th Cir. 1991)), or ―supply
additional factual allegations to round out a plaintiff‘s complaint,‖ Whayne, 980 F. Supp. at 393
(quoting Whitney v. New Mexico, 113 F.3d 1170, 1173–74 (10th Cir. 1997)). But see Fiore v. City
of N.Y., No. 97 CIV.4935(WK), 1998 WL 755134, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 1998) (―Though
plaintiff invokes Title VII as his only federal cause of action in the 1995 [New York State Division
of Human Rights] complaint, we believe in light of the liberal construction typically afforded to pro
se litigants, we could construe that complaint to invoke the protections of the ADA.‖). Moreover,
―[t]he broad reading of the plaintiff‘s complaint does not relieve the plaintiff of the burden of
alleging sufficient facts on which a recognized legal claim could be based. . . . [C]onclusory
allegations without supporting factual averments are insufficient to state a claim on which relief can
be based.‖ Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110.
However, at least one federal district court will not read the pleadings of a pro se litigant
liberally when the party is a repetitive litigant. See, e.g., Zimmerman v. Burge, No. 06-cv-0176,
2008 WL 850677, at *8 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2008) (―‗[T]here are circumstances where an overly
litigious inmate, who is quite familiar with the legal system and with pleading requirements, may not
be afforded [the] special solicitude‘ or status that is normally afforded pro se litigants.‖) (quoting
Smith v. Burge, No. 03-cv-0955, 2006 WL 2805242, at *3 n.3 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2006)).
58. See Overton v. United States, 925 F.2d 1282, 1283 (10th Cir. 1991) (construing ―the
plaintiff‘s pro se pleadings liberally‖ upon considering the propriety of the district court having
granted summary judgment on the pro se party‘s claims); Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110 n.3 (―The Haines
rule applies to all proceedings involving a pro se litigant, including . . . summary judgment
proceedings.‖); Graham v. Lewinski, 848 F.2d 342, 344 (2d Cir. 1988) (―This court has recently
stated that special solicitude should be afforded pro se litigants generally, when confronted with
motions for summary judgment.‖); Richardson v. Kelaher, No. 97 CIV.0428, 1998 WL 812042, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 1998) (judging a pro se plaintiff‘s ―pleadings by a more lenient standard than that
accorded to ‗formal pleadings drafted by lawyers‘‖ in deciding whether to grant the defendants‘
motion for summary judgment) (quoting Haines, 404 U.S. at 520); see also Madyun v. Thompson,
657 F.2d 868, 877 (7th Cir. 1981) (―Adequate knowledge of both the right to file and the necessity of
filing counter-affidavits to oppose summary judgment is critical to the pro se litigant‘s access to a
just disposition of the merits of his claim.‖).
59. See Traguth v. Zuck, 710 F.2d 90, 94–95 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding that the trial court
improperly entered default judgment against a pro se defendant when the defendant filed an answer,
albeit after the required twenty days subsequent service of the complaint, that presented ―meritorious
defenses to most of the counts alleged in the complaint‖ and ―there were no grounds for finding that
[the pro se defendant‘s] default was willful and plaintiffs neither alleged nor proved prejudice‖);
Delso, 2007 WL 766349, at *13 (―Courts often extend the leniency given to pro se litigants in filing
their pleadings to other procedural rules which attorneys are required to follow.‖).
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and in preserving issues for appeal.60 Courts also are required to provide pro
se litigants with additional instruction about deficiencies in their court
documents before dismissing their claims. 61 Stated succinctly, courts simply
do not require pro se litigants to adhere to procedural requirements in the
same manner required of members of the bar.62
Moreover, it often can be difficult for courts to figure out whether an
attorney has drafted a document or whether a particularly adept pro se litigant
has written it, unless someone with actual knowledge of the attorney‘s
conduct steps forward and gives affirmative testimony to this effect. One
court stated that ―[i]n the past, this Court has suspected, but has been unable
to confirm that some plaintiffs outwardly proceeding pro se were in fact
receiving the assistance of trained legal counsel.‖ 63 Another court stated that
it ―[could not] reach any definitive conclusion‖ about whether the party had
―misrepresent[ed] her status as a pro se defendant in order to obtain more
leeway as an unrepresented party.‖64 This was despite the fact that the party
―claimed a limited ability to use the English language‖ and that her ―pleadings
before [the] court and the district court demonstrate[d] an obvious legal
sophistication, a complete familiarity with the rules of civil procedure, and an
excellent command of the English language.‖ 65 Thus, some courts genuinely
struggle to determine when an attorney has in fact provided legal assistance to
a litigant presenting himself or herself to the court as proceeding pro se.
Additionally, courts appear reluctant to conclude that a pro se litigant
actually has received legal assistance from an attorney without some
affirmative confirmation from a third party that this has occurred. For
60. Bates, 745 F.2d at 1150 (holding that pro se plaintiff did not waive his appeal when he
failed to object explicitly to the court entering judgment against him at trial when the jury‘s special
verdicts were inconsistent).
61. Graham, 848 F.2d at 344 (―[I]t does seem inequitable, without a more explicit warning, to
expect an incarcerated pro se [litigant] to know that in response to the State‘s motion for summary
judgment he cannot rely upon the papers already filed.‖); Karim-Panahi, 839 F.2d at 623–24 (stating
that ―before dismissing a pro se civil rights complaint for failure to state a claim, the district court
must give the plaintiff a statement of the complaint‘s deficiencies‖ and then give the pro se plaintiff
leave to amend his or her complaint); Madyun, 657 F.2d at 877 (holding that the ―district court erred
in granting summary judgment [against pro se plaintiff prisoners] without first alerting plaintiffs to
the need for counter-affidavits under Rule 56(e)‖).
62. See, e.g., Delso, 2007 WL 766349, at *13 (stating that ―in this District, courts will often
accept Motions or briefs from pro se litigants‖ without needed supporting documentation, and that
―[l]iberal treatment for pro se litigants has also been extended for certain time limitations, service
requirements, pleading requirements, submission of otherwise improper sur-reply briefs, failure to
submit a statement of uncontested facts pursuant to L.Civ.R. 56.1, and to the review given to stated
claims‖).
63. Laremont-Lopez v. Se. Tidewater Opportunity Ctr., 968 F. Supp. 1075, 1079 (E.D. Va.
1997).
64. Fin. Instruments Group, Ltd. v. Leung, 30 F. App‘x 915, 916 n.1 (10th Cir. 2002).
65. Id.
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example, one court pronounced that ―[w]hile the practice of filing pro se
pleadings which are actually prepared by a legal advocate does taint the legal
process and create disparity between the parties, more than a mere supposition
should be alleged before utilizing the inherent power of the Court to
thoroughly prejudice a party by striking all of their pleadings.‖ 66 Similarly,
another court suspicious of a pro se litigant having received assistance from
an attorney nevertheless went on to apply ―the generous reading that is to be
afforded to pro se pleadings—a proposition that really should not be
applicable if the Complaint was in fact drafted by or with the assistance of a
lawyer.‖67 This occurred notwithstanding the court‘s statement that ―[d]espite
[the litigant‘s] nominal pro se status, it seems pretty clear that someone
familiar with legal practice and procedure has had a major hand in drafting the
Complaint.‖68
Thus, a significant risk exists that courts will interpret pro se litigants‘
documents liberally when an attorney in fact has drafted the document
concerned and, thus, will give unfair and unmerited assistance to the nominal
pro se party. Additionally, this unmerited assistance continues throughout the
course of the lawsuit, especially at points when the opposing party is
attempting to get the court to dismiss the nominal pro se litigant‘s legal
claims. Such assistance has the great potential to allow unmeritorious claims
to remain in court well beyond the point at which a court would have
dismissed them if the court knew that the nominal pro se party had hired
counsel to set out his or her legal claims or arguments. This continuation of
unmeritorious litigation not only burdens the opposing party with more legal
expenses, but also burdens an already overtaxed court system and unfairly
expends the precious time and resources of the courts.
Additionally, one court has noted that undisclosed attorney ghostwriting
of court documents for pro se litigants ultimately may affect all pro se
litigants negatively because such conduct may taint courts‘ views of ―well
meaning pro se litigants who have no legal guidance at all and rely on the
Court‘s discretionary patience in order to have a level litigating field.‖ 69
66. Somerset Pharms. v. Kimball, 168 F.R.D. 69, 72 (M.D. Fla. 1996).
67. Watkins v. Associated Brokers, Inc., No. 98 C 3316, 1998 WL 312124, at *1 (N.D. Ill. June
5, 1998) (citation omitted).
68. Id.; see also Stone v. Allen, No. 07-0681-WS-M, 2007 WL 2807351, at *1 n.1 (S.D. Ala.
Sept. 25, 2007) (noting that ―[t]he level of sophistication, polish and legal research contained in
plaintiff‘s filings strongly suggest that they were ghostwritten by counsel,‖ but failing to state that the
court would treat the plaintiff‘s filings in any manner different from the treatment applied to
documents filed by a litigant actually proceeding pro se); Jachnik v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 07cv-00263-MSK-BNB, 2007 WL 1216523, at *1 n.2 (D. Colo. Apr. 24, 2007) (construing the nominal
pro se plaintiff‘s complaint liberally despite stating that the complaint ―appears to have been ghostwritten by an attorney‖).
69. In re Mungo, 305 B.R. 762, 769 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2003).
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Thus, pervasive uncertainty about whether litigants presenting themselves as
pro se are in fact receiving the aid of an attorney might eventually cause
courts to be very reluctant to provide additional assistance to litigants who in
fact are proceeding completely in a pro se capacity.
Attorney ghostwriting of pro se litigants‘ court documents also can be
unfair in that it can allow attorneys to cast aspersions on opposing counsel, or
even the opposing party, without accountability. One court has decried that
attorney ghostwriting of a pro se litigant‘s court documents ―enables an
attorney to launch an attack, even against another member of the Bar . . .
without showing his [or her] face,‖ which ―smacks of the gross unfairness that
characterizes hit-and-run tactics.‖70 While that case concerned a repetitive
plaintiff who had filed a vexatious lawsuit against a law firm, among other
parties, 71 attorney ghostwriting of court documents could give rise to attacks
on the integrity or conduct of opposing counsel for which the undisclosed
counsel would not have to answer even in meritorious cases. Therefore,
ghostwriting of court documents has the potential to increase incivility
between parties to litigation and to decrease professionalism between
attorneys who are in fact representing opposing parties.
Finally, ghostwriting can be particularly unfair to the opposing side when
the opposing side actually is proceeding pro se and is unaware that the other
nominal pro se party in fact is receiving assistance from legal counsel in the
litigation. In this scenario, the party who in fact is proceeding pro se is
deprived of material information about the legal assistance to which the
nominal pro se party has access. If privy to this information, the opposing
party might change his or her mind about proceeding pro se and go ahead and
hire an attorney. 72 Thus, not having this information could put the opposing
party at a severe disadvantage.

70. Klein v. Spear, Leeds & Kellogg, 309 F. Supp. 341, 343 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); see also Delso v.
Trs. for Ret. Plan for Hourly Employees of Merck & Co., No. 04-3009, 2007 WL 766349, at *15
(D.N.J. Mar. 6, 2007) (―One of the earliest cases regarding ghostwriting laid its concern in the
enabling of ‗an attorney to launch an attack against another member of the Bar . . . without showing
his face.‘‖) (quoting Klein, 309 F. Supp. at 343); In re Mungo, 305 B.R. at 768 (―An obvious result
of the anonymity afforded ghost-writing attorneys is that they cannot be policed pursuant to the
applicable ethical, professional, and substantive rules enforced by the Court and members of the bar
since no other party to the existing litigation is aware of the ghost-writing attorney‘s existence.‖).
71. Klein, 309 F. Supp. at 342.
72. See CAL. COMM ‘N ON ACCESS TO JUSTICE, REPORT ON LIMITED SCOPE LEGAL
ASSISTANCE WITH INITIAL RECOMMENDATIONS app. at 41 (2003) (―There should be a level playing
field for [the] opposing party in an unbundled situation. If one side had known the other side had an
attorney, instead of learning of it when, all of a sudden, an attorney appeared at a court hearing, they
might have brought one too.‖); see also infra Part V (discussing hypothetical ―stealth‖ representation
by attorney of nominal pro se litigant through the course of litigation, including during settlement
negotiations).
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2. Ghostwriting Violates Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11
The second major rationale that courts have used to conclude that
undisclosed attorney ghostwriting of court documents is unethical is that this
conduct violates the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11.
Courts have reasoned that by failing to sign documents that the attorney has
drafted for the nominal pro se litigant, the attorney improperly avoids his or
her duty to certify that a reasonable basis exists for both the facts and legal
arguments presented in the document.73 This could leave a court without
anyone to sanction should it conclude that the document concerned is ―legally
or factually frivolous‖ because the rule prohibits ―the imposition of monetary
sanctions against a represented party for filing legally frivolous claims.‖ 74 In
fact, whether certain conduct is sanctionable in the first place may depend on
whether counsel or a party engaged in it because ―certain conduct may be
sanctionable if committed by counsel but not if committed by a party.‖75
Furthermore, ―[a court] could encounter legal and factual obstacles if it
attempted to impose sanctions‖ due to a violation of Rule 11 on the attorney

73. Duran v. Carris, 238 F.3d 1268, 1271–72 (10th Cir. 2001) (―Mr. Snow‘s actions in
providing substantial legal assistance to Mr. Duran without entering an appearance in this case . . .
inappropriately shields Mr. Snow from responsibility and accountability for his actions and counsel,‖
in part, because the attorney avoided his obligations under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11.); Ellis
v. Maine, 448 F.2d 1325, 1328 (1st Cir. 1971) (―What we fear is that in some cases actual members
of the bar represent petitioners, informally or otherwise, and prepare briefs for them which the
assisting lawyers do not sign, and thus escape the obligation imposed on members of the bar, typified
by F.R.Civ.P. 11, but which exist in all cases, criminal as well as civil, of representing to the court
that there is good ground to support the assertions made.‖); Delso, 2007 WL 766349, at *17 (―By
failing to affirmatively advise the Court of his assistance of Delso, and by permitting Delso to submit
ghostwritten briefing to the Court under her own name, Shapiro failed to certify documentation that
he prepared that was submitted to the Court and violated the spirit of [Rule 11].‖); Wesley v. Don
Stein Buick, Inc., 987 F. Supp. 884, 886 (D. Kan. 1997) (―[G]host-writing has been condemned as a
deliberate evasion of the responsibilities imposed on counsel by Rule 11, Fed.R.Civ.P.‖); LaremontLopez v. Se. Tidewater Opportunity Ctr., 968 F. Supp. 1075, 1078 (E.D. Va. 1997) (finding that
attorney ghostwriting of pro se litigant‘s court documents ―undermines the purpose of the signature
certification requirement‖); Clarke v. United States, 955 F. Supp. 593, 598 (E.D. Va. 1997) (―Ghostwriting by an attorney of a ‗pro se‘ plaintiff‘s pleadings has been condemned as both unethical and a
deliberate evasion of the responsibilities imposed on attorneys by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
11.‖), vacated, 1998 WL 559754 (4th Cir. Sept. 2, 1998); Johnson v. Bd. of County Comm‘rs, 868 F.
Supp. 1226, 1231 (D. Colo. 1994) (―[G]host-writing has been condemned as a deliberate evasion of
the responsibilities imposed on counsel by Rule 11, F.R.Civ.P.‖); In re Mungo, 305 B.R. at 768
(―Ghost-writing frustrates the application of these rules [concerning attorney certification through
signature of court documents] by shielding the attorney who drafted pleadings for pro se litigants in a
cloak of anonymity.‖); see also supra Part III.C (discussing the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 11(b)).
74. Laremont-Lopez, 968 F. Supp. at 1079; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(5)(A) (stating that
―[t]he court must not impose a monetary sanction: (A) against a represented party for violating Rule
11(b)(2)‖).
75. United States v. Eleven Vehicles, 966 F. Supp. 361, 367 (E.D. Pa. 1997).
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who actually drafted the document concerned because the identity of the
actual drafter is unknown.76
3. Ghostwriting Frustrates Efficient Court Administration
The third rationale that some courts have used to support the decision to
prohibit attorney ghostwriting of court documents is that such conduct
frustrates a court‘s efficient administration of its case docket. For example,
even if the court is able to discover the identity of the attorney responsible for
drafting a deficient document, such an investigation causes the court to have
to expend time and resources that would have been unnecessary had the
attorney originally disclosed his or her identity and the assistance provided to
the litigant on the document.77 One bankruptcy court has noted why
knowledge of the identity of the person who drafted court documents is
particularly important to the timely administration and discharge of a
bankruptcy case. The court explained that ―it may be more important that . . .
attorneys who limit their representation sign the [initial bankruptcy] petition
precisely because they will not be representing the debtor throughout the
case‖ and because it is fairly common for documents filed in bankruptcy court
to contain errors and omissions, which attorneys routinely correct by
amending those documents.78 However, if the attorney drafts the initial
bankruptcy petition and then is not involved any further in the case, ―he or she
may have no notice of the need for amendment,‖ and the client may not
recognize the need to make amendments. 79 Thus, ―[d]isclosure of the
preparer‘s identity allows the U.S. Trustee, interim trustee or creditor to
obtain clarifying or correcting disclosures.‖ 80
Another bankruptcy court has recognized that attorney ghostwriting of
documents hinders its ability to rule on emergency motions and conduct
emergency hearings. The court stated that it ―has a high volume of cases—
many, if not all, involve time-sensitive matters that require the Court to hear
matters and issue rulings in an expeditious manner.‖81 ―An integral part‖ of
the procedures that the court has developed to address such situations include
―the need for the filing party to correctly serve the motion and notice of the
hearing in an expedited fashion and be immediately prepared to present

76. Laremont-Lopez, 968 F. Supp. at 1079; see also Eleven Vehicles, 966 F. Supp. at 367
(―[G]host writing arrangements interfere with the Court‘s ability to superintend the conduct of
counsel and parties during the litigation.‖).
77. Laremont-Lopez, 968 F. Supp. at 1079.
78. In re Merriam, 250 B.R. 724, 734 n.12 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2000).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. In re Mungo, 305 B.R. 762, 770 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2003).
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evidence justifying the relief sought.‖ 82 It is difficult for this to occur if the
opposing party indicates it is proceeding pro se, but in fact is unknowingly
represented by counsel who should receive notice of such proceedings instead
of the client.83
Even if the opposing party somehow is aware that an attorney is assisting
the nominal pro se party, that party will be unaware of the extent of the
representation and whether the representation ended with the drafting of the
initial court documents or extended to dealing with subsequent motions and
hearings. These deleterious effects in bankruptcy proceedings are particularly
relevant to the issue of attorney ghostwriting of documents because
bankruptcy is an area where parties often choose to represent themselves; 84
the provision of unbundled legal services thus would be useful, and the
problem of ghostwritten court documents is likely to be prevalent.
Nevertheless, these efficiency concerns are not peculiar to bankruptcy cases.
In order for any lawsuit to proceed efficiently, the court and opposing party
need to know to whom to communicate—either the party or an attorney acting
on behalf of the party—throughout the litigation.
4. Ghostwriting Violates Court Appearance Rules
The fourth policy rationale for prohibiting attorney ghostwriting of court
documents is related to this efficiency concern. Courts have stated that
ghostwriting of documents for nominal pro se litigants violates court rules
governing when attorneys make an appearance before a court.85 One court
recognized that ghostwriting of court documents allowed attorneys to
circumvent its local rule governing when an attorney makes an appearance
because by failing to disclose his or her identity and the services provided to
the nominal pro se litigant, the attorney avoided appearing in the court. 86
Customarily, an attorney makes an appearance in a court ―by signing and
82. Id.
83. The court in this specific case presented a slightly different point, stating that ―[p]ro se
litigants frequently have difficulty meeting these requirements . . . thus taxing the Court‘s system and
forcing the Court to expend more time and effort to handle the matter,‖ and thus the ―Court must be
able to look to attorneys of record to perform these tasks for the benefit of their clients and case
administration.‖ Id. However, this is a rationale for discouraging parties from participating pro se in
bankruptcy proceedings rather than for requiring them to disclose that they are in fact represented by
counsel instead of continuing to proceed under nominal pro se status.
84. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
85. Laremont-Lopez v. Se. Tidewater Opportunity Ctr., 968 F. Supp. 1075, 1079 (E.D. Va.
1997) (―[T]he practice of ghost-writing pleadings or motions for otherwise pro se litigants allows
attorneys to circumvent [a local rule governing entry of an appearance and withdrawal of
representation].‖); see also In re Merriam, 250 B.R. at 734 (―[The attorney who prepared a
bankruptcy petition] chose not to sign the petition because he did not want to enter a general
appearance in this bankruptcy case by customary practice of signing and filing a pleading.‖).
86. Laremont-Lopez, 968 F. Supp. at 1079.
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filing a pleading.‖87 If an attorney ―has entered an appearance in a civil or
criminal action, withdrawal is permitted only by order of the court, and after
reasonable notice to the party represented.‖ 88 Moreover, the purpose of the
rule governing how an attorney makes an appearance is ―to provide for
communication between the litigants and the court, as well as ensuring that
the court is able to fairly and efficiently administer the litigation.‖89 The four
policy rationales discussed above have led courts to conclude that attorney
ghostwriting is prohibited and to resoundingly condemn this activity.
B. The “Mixed Bag” of Approaches by the American Bar Association and
State and Local Ethics Panels
Ethics opinions addressing attorney ghostwriting of court documents for
nominal pro se litigants have not spoken with the near unanimity that courts
have. In fact, the ABA recently changed its position on this activity,
concluding that ethics rules do not prohibit it. 90 However, the majority of
opinions from state and local ethics committees require attorneys to disclose
in some manner to the court and opposing counsel when they have drafted
court documents for an otherwise pro se litigant. 91 In contrast, a small number
of state and local ethics opinions have concluded that ghostwriting attorneys
do not have to disclose this conduct, 92 and some commentators continue to
argue against requiring disclosure of attorney ghostwriting. 93
1. The Old ABA Stance Prohibiting Attorney Ghostwriting
In 1978, the ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility
addressed the appropriateness under the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility of an attorney ghostwriting pleadings and providing other legal
87. In re Merriam, 250 B.R. at 734 n.14. However, ―[t]he manner of entering an appearance is
regulated by local rule.‖ Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (2000) (entitled ―Appearance personally or
by counsel‖ and stating that ―the parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by
counsel as, by the rules of such courts, respectively, are permitted to manage and conduct causes
therein‖). As of 1988, seventy-three federal districts out of ninety-four had a local rule dealing with
the appearance and withdrawal of counsel. 12 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER &
RICHARD L. MARCUS, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3154 n.12 (2d ed. 1997) (citing
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States, Local
Rules Project app. A (1988)).
88. Laremont-Lopez, 968 F. Supp. at 1079; see also MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R.
1.16(c) (2002) (stating that a ―lawyer must comply with applicable law requiring notice to or
permission of a tribunal when terminating a representation‖ and that ―[w]hen ordered to do so . . . , a
lawyer shall continue representation notwithstanding good cause for terminating the representation‖).
89. Laremont-Lopez, 968 F. Supp. at 1079.
90. See infra Part IV.B.1–2.
91. See infra Part IV.B.3.
92. See infra Part IV.B.3.
93. See infra Part IV.C.
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services to a nominal pro se litigant without disclosure to the court or
opposing counsel.94 The opinion specifically dealt with an attorney ―who
assisted a ‗pro se‘ litigant in preparing jury instructions, memoranda of
authorities and other documents submitted to the Court.‖95 At one point, the
attorney ―involved also ‗sat in on‘ the [nominal pro se client‘s] trial.‖ 96
Apparently, before this occurred, ―neither the Court nor the lawyer(s) for the
other party or parties knew of the lawyer‘s previous participation on behalf of
the litigant or the extent of [this participation.]‖97
The committee began its analysis by finding that the nominal pro se
litigant had ―engaged in a misrepresentation (perhaps unwitting) by professing
to be without representation . . . when, in truth, he was receiving active and
rather extensive assistance of undisclosed counsel.‖ 98 The committee went on
to find that the attorney‘s conduct was unethical because the attorney was
―involved in the litigant‘s misrepresentation‖ and such conduct violated
Disciplinary Rule 1-102(A)(4) of the Model Code, which prohibited attorneys
from engaging ―‗in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, or
misrepresentation.‘‖99
However, the opinion did not indicate exactly how or to what extent the
attorney should have disclosed his assistance to the nominal pro se client. In
other words, the opinion did not state whether the attorney should have just
indicated on the documents drafted for his client that the client was receiving
legal assistance from an attorney generally or whether the attorney should
have disclosed his identity on such documents. This opinion also did not
indicate how extensively an attorney needed to assist a pro se litigant before
he or she must disclose the fact of this aid to a court. In fact, the opinion
seemed to suggest that not all legal assistance provided to pro se litigants
would need to be disclosed: ―We do not intend to suggest that a lawyer may
never give advice to a litigant who is otherwise proceeding pro se, or that a
lawyer could not, for example, prepare or assist in the preparation of a
pleading for a litigant who is otherwise acting pro se.‖100 The committee
noted that ―the determination of the propriety of such a lawyer‘s actions will

94. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof‘l Responsibility, Informal Op. 1414 (1978).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. (quoting the MODEL CODE OF PROF‘L RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102(A)(4) as stating: ―‗A
lawyer shall not: . . . (4) Engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation.‘‖). Model Rule 8.4(c) is the closest corollary to DR 1-102(A)(4) in the current
Model Rules of Professional Conduct. See supra note 37 and accompanying text (discussing the
relevant language from Model Rule 8.4(c) potentially applicable to attorney ghostwriting).
100. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof‘l Responsibility, Informal Op. 1414 (1978).
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depend on the particular facts involved.‖ 101
―Extensive undisclosed
participation by a lawyer, however, that permits the litigant falsely to appear
without substantial professional assistance is improper . . . .‖102
2. The New ABA Position Allowing Attorney Ghostwriting
The ABA, though, in a recent, superseding opinion changed its position
on attorney ghostwriting. 103 In May 2007, the ABA‘s Standing Committee on
Ethics and Professional Responsibility issued a formal opinion in which it
concluded that attorney ghostwriting of documents for litigants holding
themselves out to the court as pro se is appropriate under the Model Rules of
Professional Responsibility without disclosure. 104 The committee‘s main
rationale for this conclusion was that a court will not disadvantage the
opposing party by applying a more liberal interpretation to ghostwritten
documents.105 This results because a court will be able to tell when an
attorney has provided such assistance, and if the court cannot detect this, then
the attorney did not help the nominal pro se party enough to disadvantage the
other party.106 Therefore, ―[b]ecause there is no reasonable concern that a
litigant appearing pro se will receive an unfair benefit from a tribunal as a
result of behind-the-scenes legal assistance, the nature or extent of such
assistance is immaterial and need not be disclosed.‖107
The committee further concluded that attorneys who ghostwrite
documents do not ―circumvent[] court rules requiring the assumption of
responsibility for their pleadings,‖ such as Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
11.108 The committee reasoned that because the attorney never actually signs
the documents and, thus, does not ―make[] an affirmative statement to the
tribunal concerning the matter,‖ this conduct never triggers duties set out in
Rule 11.109
Similarly, the committee concluded that attorney ghostwriting of
documents did not involve dishonest conduct, which Model Rule 8.4(c)
prohibits, because the ―lawyer is making no statement at all to the forum

101. Id.
102. Id.
103. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof‘l Responsibility, Formal Op. 07-446 (2007).
104. Id. The committee examined the appropriateness of attorney ghostwriting under Model
Rules of Professional Conduct 1.2(d), 3.3(b), 4.1(b), and 8.4(c). Id.; see also supra Part III.A–B
(discussing the language from these rules potentially applicable to attorney ghostwriting).
105. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof‘l Responsibility, Formal Op. 07-446 (2007).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
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regarding the nature or scope of the representation.‖ 110 ―Absent an affirmative
statement by the client, that can be attributed to the lawyer, that the
documents were prepared without legal assistance, the lawyer has not been
dishonest within the meaning of Rule 8.4(c).‖111 Therefore, according to the
committee, an attorney does not mislead a court by ghostwriting documents
for a nominal pro se litigant.
The committee acknowledged its earlier opinion applying the Model Code
of Professional Responsibility to ghostwriting and characterized that opinion
as ―stating that disclosure of at least the fact of legal assistance must be made
to avoid misleading the court and other parties, but that the lawyer providing
the assistance need not be identified.‖ 112 However, as set out above, the
earlier opinion did not address at all the type of disclosure necessary, whether
just the fact of assistance or the actual identity of the attorney involved. 113
3. State and Local Ethics Panels
State and local ethics panels are all over the proverbial board on this issue.
The overwhelming majority of ethics panels to have addressed the matter
have concluded that an attorney must disclose his or her drafting of court
documents for a nominal pro se litigant. 114 However, these ethics opinions
have disagreed about the extent of the disclosure that must be made. Some
ethics opinions have concluded that the identity of the attorney who provided
the legal assistance must be disclosed in some manner,115 while others have
determined that only the fact of the legal assistance, and not the attorney‘s
identity, needs to be disclosed.116 Moreover, the ethics panels in the
jurisdictions that require some type of disclosure do not agree on how
substantial the legal assistance has to be in order to trigger this duty. Some
consider any preparation of pleadings beyond an attorney helping a client fill
out a standard form to be significant enough to require disclosure117 while
others have concluded that more substantial assistance needs to occur to
110. Id. The committee went on to suggest that disclosure might even violate an attorney‘s
duty of confidentiality to the nominal pro se client under Model Rule 1.6 and an attorney‘s duty to
―abide by a client‘s decisions concerning the objectives of [the] representation‖ under Model Rule
1.2(a). Id. at nn.10–11; see also MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2003); MODEL
RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a), (c) (2002). This Article addresses the confidentiality
argument, infra Part IV.C.
111. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof‘l Responsibility, Formal Op. 07-446 (2007).
112. Id.
113. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof‘l Responsibility, Informal Op. 1414 (1978); see also
supra Part IV.B.1 (discussing the ABA‘s earlier opinion on attorney ghostwriting).
114. See infra Part IV.B.3.a–b.
115. See infra Part IV.B.3.a.
116. See infra Part IV.B.3.b.
117. See infra notes 124, 141–42 and accompanying text.
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trigger the attorney‘s duty to disclose. 118 Finally, a small number of ethics
panels have concluded that a ghostwriting attorney simply does not have a
duty to disclose to anyone even the fact of his or her having provided legal
assistance to a nominal pro se litigant no matter how substantial the legal
assistance given. 119
a. Opinions Requiring Disclosure of Fact of Ghostwriting and the Identity of
the Ghostwriting Attorney
Several state and local ethics committees have concluded that an attorney
who provides legal assistance to nominal pro se litigants must disclose his or
her identity as well as the fact of having provided such assistance. For
example, the New York State Bar Association Committee on Professional
Ethics concluded this when it addressed the issue of attorney ghostwriting of
the pleadings of a pro se litigant. 120 The committee endorsed the plan of the
inquirer who proposed sending along with the pleadings to counsel for the
opposing party a cover letter stating that the client was submitting the
pleadings concerned ―on a pro se basis‖ and that the attorney‘s representation
of the client was limited to the drafting of these pleadings and providing the
client with the cover letter.121 The committee acknowledged that ―the pro
bono ‗efforts of individual lawyers,‘ together with the availability of legal
services offices, ‗are often not enough to meet the need‘ of the indigent.‖ 122
Nevertheless, the committee concluded that just indicating the fact that the
nominal pro se litigant had received some legal assistance without revealing
the identity of the attorney who had provided such assistance was
―insufficient to fulfill the purposes of the disclosure requirement.‖ 123 The
committee expressly determined that ―the preparation of a pleading, even a
simple one, for a pro se litigant constitutes ‗active and substantial‘ aid
requiring disclosure of the lawyer‘s participation.‖124
The Kentucky Bar Association‘s ethics panel came to a similar
conclusion, finding that ―counsel‘s name should appear somewhere on the
pleading, although counsel is limiting his or her assistance to the preparation
118. See infra notes 136–38 and accompanying text.
119. See infra Part IV.B.3.c.
120. N.Y. State Bar Ass‘n Comm. on Prof‘l Ethics, Op. 613 (1990).
121. Id. The inquirer was ―the managing attorney of a legal services office in an upstate rural
county who [had] been unable to obtain attorneys within the county to undertake pro bono
representation of indigent persons served with a summons and complaint in divorce actions.‖ Id.
122. Id. (quoting the version of N.Y. Code of Professional Responsibility EC 2-25 in effect in
1990). The committee went on to state that it ―firmly believe[d] that the creation of barriers to the
procurement of legal advice by those in need and who are unable to pay in the name of legal ethics ill
serves the profession.‖ Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
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of the pleading.‖125 It agreed with opinions from other states that found ―that
the preparation of a pleading, other than a previously prepared form devised
specifically for use by pro se litigants, constitute[d] substantial assistance that
must be disclosed to the Court and the adversary.‖126 The opinion recognized,
on the other hand, that ―the opponent cannot reasonably demand‖ that the
court compel ―counsel providing such limited assistance . . . to enter an
appearance for all purposes.‖127 ―A contrary view would place a higher value
on tactical maneuvering than on the obligation to provide assistance to
indigent litigants.‖128 However, the opinion stated that ―[t]he inclusion of
forms for use by pro se litigants in a handbook intended for distribution to
laymen has not been viewed as the practice of law or as active and substantial
assistance implicating any of the above considerations.‖129
An opinion from the Delaware State Bar Association Committee on
Professional Ethics provides another example of an ethics committee that
concluded that ―it is improper for an attorney to fail to disclose the fact that he
or she has provided significant assistance to a litigant.‖130 The committee
concluded that failing to disclose conduct constituting ―significant assistance‖
to a nominal pro se litigant ―misleads the court and opposing counsel in
violation of Rule 8.4(c).‖131 The committee reasoned that a litigant who
received limited legal services from an attorney but proceeded pro se in the
litigation ―may receive some advantage, in the form of more lenient treatment
concerning procedural matters, for example, if the tribunal perceives the
125. Ky. Bar Ass‘n, Ethics Op. E-343 (1991). The inquiry to the committee came also from a
legal services organization that could not ―satisfy all requests for assistance, and [could not] always
obtain alternative (volunteer) pro bono counsel.‖ Id. However, the court noted that its ―answer
would also apply to limited representation provided by lawyers in private practice.‖ Id.
126. Id. The opinion went on to state that an attorney, though, ―should not hold forth that his or
her representation was limited, and that the litigant is unrepresented, and yet continue to provide
behind the scenes representation.‖ Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Del. State Bar Ass‘n Comm. on Prof‘l Ethics, Op. 1994-2 (1994). Once again, the inquiry
to the committee came from the director of a legal services organization who, ―[b]ecause of staffing
limitations and other reasons,‖ had staff attorneys who ―sometimes agree[d] to provide services on a
limited basis‖ to litigants often who had cases ―in Family Court or Justice of the Peace Court, which
use forms for most pleadings.‖ Id. The opinion went on to state that:
If the litigant‘s case [was] in the Court of Common Pleas or [was] an appeal to
Superior Court, as in unemployment compensation cases, the litigant may be
advised as to how to answer the complaint or file an appeal, or the staff
attorneys may prepare the answer or appeal for the litigant‘s signature. The
litigants are also advised how to file and serve the completed documents.
Id.
131. Id.
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litigant to be unrepresented.‖ 132 The committee emphasized that the
―seriousness of the ethical problem increases in proportion to the extent to
which services are provided.‖133
Moreover, the committee recommended, similar to the New York State
Bar Association committee, that the attorney make the required disclosure
through ―a letter to the court and opposing counsel, indicating the limited
extent of the representation.‖134 The committee indicated that such an
attorney, though, should not ―sign pleadings, motions or other papers where
the attorney and client have agreed that the attorney will not be representing
the client in litigation‖ because ―[t]he attorney‘s signature in such a case
would misleadingly indicate that the attorney would be representing the client
in the litigation.‖135
However, contrary to the ethics opinions from the New York and
Kentucky state bar associations, the Delaware ethics committee concluded
that in order to constitute ―significant assistance,‖ an attorney‘s assistance
must go ―further than merely helping a litigant to fill out an initial pleading,
and/or providing initial general advice and information.‖136 Only ―[i]f an
attorney drafts court papers (other than an initial pleading) on the client‘s
behalf‖ or provides legal assistance that ―is on-going‖ would the attorney
need to disclose the provision of such legal services. 137 The committee
apparently wanted to allow the legal services organization that made the
initial inquiry to be able to continue helping nominal pro se litigants in family
law and worker‘s compensation matters to fill out their initial pleadings
without disclosing that this assistance had occurred. 138

132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. Although not explicitly stated in the opinion, the Delaware ethics opinion appeared to
require that an attorney who provided ―significant assistance‖ to a nominal pro se litigant disclose his
or her identity in addition to the fact of having provided such legal assistance because the committee
explicitly stated that it ―agree[d] with the New York State Bar Association ethics committee in
concluding that disclosure of this assistance by means of a letter to the court and opposing counsel,
indicating the limited extent of the representation, is required,‖ id., and as set out above, the New
York State Bar Association‘s ethics opinion required that a ghostwriting attorney disclose his or her
identity. See supra notes 120–24 and accompanying text.
135. Del. State Bar Ass‘n Comm. on Prof‘l Ethics, Op. 1994-2 (1994).
136. Id.
137. Id. However, the committee did caution that ―whether the pleadings are signed by a pro
se litigant or by a staff attorney, the attorney should not participate in the preparation of pleadings
without satisfying himself or herself that the pleading is not frivolous or interposed for an improper
purpose.‖ Id.
138. See id.
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b. Opinions Requiring Disclosure of Fact of Ghostwriting but Not the Identity
of the Ghostwriting Attorney
The ethics panels of some other state and local bar associations have
concluded that an attorney who provides limited legal services to a nominal
pro se litigant need only disclose the fact of the assistance and not his or her
identity. For example, the New York City Bar Association‘s ethics committee
concluded that ―what must be disclosed is the fact that the litigant appearing
pro se is receiving legal assistance, not the identity of the person rendering
such assistance.‖139 The committee suggested that this could be indicated by
including ―Prepared by Counsel‖ on the pleadings concerned.140
However, the committee departed with the analysis of some other
jurisdictions‘ ethics panels with regard to the level of legal assistance that
would trigger this duty to disclose. The committee found an attorney had to
make such a disclosure when he or she had rendered ―active and substantial
assistance‖ to a nominal pro se litigant. 141 ―[D]rafting any pleadings falls into
that category, except where no more is involved than assisting a litigant to fill
out a previously prepared form devised particularly for use by pro se
litigants.‖142
In concluding that it was unethical for an attorney to ghostwrite court
documents for a nominal pro se litigant, the committee noted ―the special
consideration‖ that courts afford to pro se litigants throughout a piece of
litigation ―to compensate for their lack of legal representation‖ and found that
the failure of a nominal pro se litigant ―to reveal that he [or she] is in fact
receiving advice and help from an attorney may be seriously misleading.‖ 143
This results because the nominal pro se litigant ―may be given deferential or
preferential treatment to the disadvantage of his [or her] adversary.‖144 The
committee also acknowledged that the ―court will have been burdened
unnecessarily with the extra labor of making certain that his [or her] rights as
a pro se litigant were fully protected.‖145 Therefore, an attorney failing to
disclose, or to ensure that his or her client will disclose, the legal assistance
that the pro se litigant received ―may amount to conduct involving dishonesty,

139. N.Y. City Bar Ass‘n Comm. on Prof‘l & Judicial Ethics, Formal Op. 1987-2 (1987).
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. The committee went on state that ―the making available of manuals and pleading
forms would not ordinarily be deemed ‗active and substantial legal assistance.‘‖ Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
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fraud, deceit or misrepresentation,‖ which would violate New York
Disciplinary Rule 1-102(A)(4).146
Similarly, the Florida State Bar Association‘s Committee on Professional
Ethics concluded that a ghostwriting attorney should disclose the fact of the
legal assistance provided to the nominal pro se litigant by including ―Prepared
with Assistance of Counsel‖ on the document concerned. 147 One judge
surveyed by the committee noted that not disclosing this legal assistance to
the nominal pro se litigant would violate an attorney‘s ―duty of candor to the
tribunal.‖148 Interestingly, in explaining its rationale for coming to this
conclusion, the committee noted a practical consideration expressed by
―County Court Judges who responded to an inquiry from the Committee‖
about an earlier opinion on the topic. 149 These judges ―expressed concern
about pro se litigants who appear before them having received limited
assistance from an attorney and having little or no understanding of the
contents of the pleadings these litigants have filed.‖ 150 These judges ―[a]lmost
unanimously . . . believed that disclosure of professional legal assistance
would prove beneficial, at least where the lawyer‘s assistance goes beyond
helping a party fill out a simple standardized form.‖ 151
c. Opinions Concluding that Ghostwriting Can Occur Without Disclosure
The ethics panels in a handful of state and local jurisdictions have
concluded that attorneys ethically can ghostwrite court documents for litigants
presenting themselves to the court as pro se without disclosing this legal
assistance to the court or opposing counsel. A fairly recent ethics opinion
from the Arizona Committee on the Rules of Professional Conduct illustrated
this viewpoint in concluding that ―disclosure to the court or tribunal of an
146. Id. At the time of this opinion, New York Disciplinary Rule 1-102(A)(4) provided that ―a
lawyer shall not engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.‖ Id.
Model Rule 8.4(c) contains a similar prohibition in the current version of the Model Rules of
Professional Responsibility. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 8.4(c) (2002); see also supra
note 37 and accompanying text (discussing the relevant language from Model Rule 8.4(c) potentially
applicable to attorney ghostwriting).
147. Fla. State Bar Ass‘n Comm. on Prof‘l Ethics, Op. 79-7 (Reconsideration) (2000). In this
opinion, the committee reconsidered its earlier opinion from 1979 in which it concluded that ―there is
no affirmative obligation on an attorney to sign pleadings prepared by him if he is not an attorney of
record.‖ Fla. State Bar Ass‘n Comm. on Prof‘l Ethics, Op. 79-7 (1979). Thus, the Florida Bar has
moved in the opposite direction of the ABA, going from allowing attorney ghostwriting to
prohibiting it.
148. Fla. State Bar Ass‘n Comm. on Prof‘l Ethics, Op. 79-7 (Reconsideration) (2000) (noting
that Florida Rule 4-3.3 of Rules Regulating the Florida Bar set forth counsel‘s duty of candor to the
tribunal).
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
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attorney‘s assistance with a court filing is not necessary when the pro per
client submits the document for filing.‖152 Similar to the reasoning in the
ABA‘s recent ethics opinion,153 the Arizona committee‘s main rationale for
concluding that this conduct was ―not inherently misleading to the court or
tribunal‖ was that ―[w]hen presented with a document prepared with
assistance of counsel, . . . a court or tribunal can generally determine whether
that document was written with a lawyer‘s help.‖ 154 Furthermore, the
committee concluded that such conduct did not violate Arizona‘s Ethics Rule
3.3(a)(1), which ―proscribes against an attorney making or failing to correct a
false statement of fact or law to the court or tribunal,‖ 155 because it ―[did] not
believe that the omission of an attorney‘s name from a filed document is a
false statement of fact or law that is either made or needs to be corrected.‖ 156
Accordingly, ―[b]ecause the disclosure of an attorney‘s assistance with court
filings is not obligatory under the ethical rules,‖ an attorney did not violate
Arizona‘s ethics rule through the acts of another when the pro per client
submitted the documents without disclosing that he or she had received legal
assistance in creating the document.157
The Arizona committee did note that Arizona Rule 11 of Civil Procedure
might proscribe this conduct and took pains to note that it was addressing the
appropriateness of this conduct only ―under the [Arizona] ethical rules‖ rather
than the ―potential applicability of Rule 11 as a matter of law.‖ 158
Additionally, the committee explicitly stated that it was ―only confirm[ing]
that the practice is not prohibited by Arizona‘s Ethical Rules‖ and that it

152. Ariz. Comm. on the Rules of Prof‘l Conduct, Formal Op. No. 2005-06 (2005).
Presumably, the ethics panel used the term ―pro per‖ as short for ―in propria persona,‖ which means
―[i]n one‘s own proper person.‖ BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 792 (6th. ed. 1990). Similar to the
ethics opinions discussed above, the inquirers were ―affiliated with an agency providing legal
services to low- and moderate-income individuals,‖ and one of the attorneys ―practice[d] in the area
of family law.‖ Ariz. Comm. on the Rules of Prof‘l Conduct, Formal Op. No. 2005-06 (2005).
153. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof‘l Responsibility, Formal Op. 07-446 (2007).
154. Ariz. Comm. on the Rules of Prof‘l Conduct, Formal Op. No. 2005-06 (2005); see also
Ala. Bar Ass‘n Ethics Comm., Ethics Op. No. 93-1 n.2 (1993) (―[T]he committee believes that
judges are usually able to discern when a pro se litigant has received the assistance of counsel in
preparing or drafting pleadings‖ and that therefore ―any preferential treatment otherwise afforded the
litigant will likely be tempered, if not overlooked.‖).
155. Ariz. Comm. on the Rules of Prof‘l Conduct, Formal Op. No. 2005-06 (2005).
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.; see also Me. Prof‘l Ethics Comm‘n of Bd. of Overseers of Bar, Op. No. 89 (1988)
(noting that while an attorney who drafts a complaint for an otherwise pro se client ―was not required
to sign the complaint or otherwise enter his appearance in court as counsel for the plaintiff,‖ the
lawyer still ―remains responsible to the client for assuring that the complaint is adequate and does not
violate the requirements of Rule 11 of Maine Rules of Civil Procedure‖).
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―[did] not approve of attorneys ghostwriting documents that are filed with
courts and tribunals without providing some form of disclosure.‖ 159
The Professional Responsibility and Ethics Committee for the Los
Angeles County Bar Association also concluded that an attorney ethically
may ghostwrite documents for a nominal pro se litigant without disclosing
this activity to the court.160 The committee‘s main rationale for this
conclusion was ―that there is no specific statute or rule which prohibits [an
attorney] from assisting [a client] in the preparation of pleadings or other
documents to be filed with the court, without disclosing to the court the
attorney‘s role.‖161 Although noting in a footnote case authority from other
jurisdictions that disapproved of this conduct,162 the committee stated that it
had not found any ―published court decisions in California state or federal
courts which have required an attorney‘s disclosure to the court regarding his
or her involvement in preparing pleadings or documents to be filed by a
litigant appearing in propria persona.‖163 The committee noted that ―the
filing of ‗ghost drafted‘ pleadings or documents does not deprive a judge of
the ability to control the proceedings before the court or to hold a party
responsible for frivolous, misleading [conduct] or deceit in those pleadings‖
because the court can sanction the party proceeding pro se, rather than the
attorney, for any such misconduct.164 Moreover, the court could seek to
punish the attorney, once the attorney‘s identity was discovered, by lodging ―a
complaint with the State Bar about the attorney‘s participation in the
preparation of the document.‖165 Nevertheless, the committee noted that
attorneys who ghostwrite documents for pro se litigants would have to comply
with any rulings by a federal court that required disclosure. 166
The committee noted that there is ―a nationwide debate concerning the
ethical propriety of [attorneys‘] ‗ghostwriting‘ pleadings and documents for a
pro per litigant to file with a court.‖167 In a corresponding footnote, the
committee noted several additional arguments for allowing attorney

159. Ariz. Comm. on the Rules of Prof‘l Conduct, Formal Op. No. 2005-06 (2005).
160. Los Angeles County Bar Ass‘n Prof‘l Responsibility & Ethics Comm., Formal Op. No.
502 (1999). The committee dealt with a situation where a client engaged an attorney ―to give legal
advice about the litigation and to participate in settlement negotiations,‖ and the client had filed a
―complaint which [the] attorney drafted for her on an hourly fee basis.‖ Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at n.8.
163. Id. See supra note 152 for a definition of ―in propria persona.‖
164. Los Angeles County Bar Ass‘n Prof‘l Responsibility & Ethics Comm., Formal Op. No.
502 (1999).
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
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ghostwriting of documents without disclosure. 168 The committee asserted that
―the practice promote[d] access to the courts‖ and was ―likely to improve the
quality of the pro per pleadings,‖ which would result ―in increased judicial
efficiency and fairness to the parties.‖169 Furthermore, ―the practice would
support the client‘s right to control the extent of an attorney‘s involvement‖ in
the representation. 170 However, the committee did not explain exactly how
requiring disclosure of the attorney‘s assistance would prevent a party from
entering into a limited scope representation agreement with an attorney. In
the same footnote, though, the committee did note that ―[s]ome opinions
observe that the attorney deceives, defrauds, misrepresents to, or lacks candor
with the court by anonymously assisting the pro per litigant.‖ 171 Despite
noting these arguments for requiring attorney disclosure, the committee did
not counter them or address them any further.172
Additionally, an ethics opinion from the Utah State Bar determined that it
was not improper ―for an attorney to prepare or assist in the preparation of
pleadings‖ without disclosing this to the court.173 However, the opinion noted
that ―when the attorney gives any additional assistance and the litigant
continues to inform the court that he [or she] is proceeding pro se, [the
litigant] has engaged in [a] misrepresentation by professing to be without
representation.‖174
Therefore, the general ethical prohibition against an attorney engaging in
―conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation‖ seemingly
would require the attorney to disclose any assistance beyond preparation of
pleadings.175 The committee did not elaborate much further on its reasons for
drawing this distinction other than stating that ―[t]he extent of an attorney‘s
participation on behalf of the litigant who appears to the court and other
counsel as being without professional representation is the determining
factor‖ as to whether disclosure is required. 176 The opinion concluded by
stating that ―extensive undisclosed participation by an attorney that permits
the litigant falsely to appear as being without substantial professional

168. Id. at n.8.
169. Id.
170. Id. The committee also noted that California law allowed ―legal documents assistants and
unlawful detainer assistants to assist in the preparation and filing of documents under certain
circumstances, without making disclosure to courts‖ and that requiring attorneys ―to make
disclosures to courts‖ might involve ―an uneven application of law.‖ Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Utah State Bar Ethics Advisory Op. Comm., Op. No. 74 (1981).
174. Id.
175. Id. (quoting UTAH DISCIPLINARY RULE 1-102(A)(4)).
176. Utah State Bar Ethics Advisory Op. Comm., Op. No. 74 (1981).
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assistance is improper.‖177 Therefore, the ethics opinions that conclude that
attorneys do not have to disclose ghostwriting tend to do so on the narrow
ground that the language of the applicable ethics rules does not expressly
prohibit such conduct, and at least one opinion would still require disclosure
to the court and opposing counsel if the attorney provides any legal assistance
beyond just drafting a pleading.
C. Arguments by Ghostwriting Proponents for Allowing Attorney
Ghostwriting Without Disclosure
Commentators who promote allowing ghostwriting of court documents for
nominal pro se litigants without disclosure have put forth several arguments.
For example, one commentator primarily asserts that courts can detect when
an attorney, as opposed to the litigant, has drafted documents. 178 Some of the
ethics opinions allowing attorney ghostwriting without disclosure noted above
have adopted this rationale. 179
However, proponents of permitting attorney ghostwriting of documents
have put forth additional arguments not necessarily emphasized by ethics
opinions. The first, and most compelling, argument is that requiring
disclosure when an attorney drafts court documents for an otherwise pro se
litigant will act as a disincentive to attorneys providing limited legal
services.180 This will result because attorneys will be afraid that courts, once
they discover the attorney‘s representation of the client, will interpret the
attorney‘s having drafted pleadings to be the equivalent of entering a general
appearance in the court involved.181
177. Id.
178. See Goldschmidt, supra note 25, at 1157 (―Practically speaking, however, ghostwriting is
obvious from the face of the legal papers filed . . . . [W]here the court sees the higher quality of the
pleadings, there is no reason to apply any liberality in construction . . . .‖).
179. See supra notes 106 and 154 and accompanying text.
180. See Klempner, supra note 5, at 671 (―Most studies have indicated that requiring disclosure
of the name and address of the attorney [who has performed unbundled drafting of legal documents]
serves as a deterrent to lawyers offering unbundled legal services.‖).
181. See Alicia M. Farley, An Important Piece of the Bundle: How Limited Appearances Can
Provide an Ethically Sound Way to Increase Access to Justice for Pro Se Litigants, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 563, 570 (2007) (―Attorneys are often cautious about arguing before a court on a limited
matter due to uncertainty that courts will abide by the limitation contained in the retainer agreement
and allow the attorney to withdraw upon completion of the agreed-upon task.‖); Goldschmidt, supra
note 25, at 1165, 1189–90 (raising the question of ―whether an attorney subject to the candor-to-thetribunal duties can then be compelled to enter an appearance and involuntarily provide legal services
beyond those provided for in the scope-of-the-representation agreement‖ and noting that ―[p]rivate
attorneys who engage in ghostwriting ‗revealed that they would be much less willing to provide this
service if they had to put their names on the pleadings‘‖); Rothermich, supra note 5, at 2725 (―If the
practice of ghostwriting itself constitutes an appearance as attorney of record . . . [, a]n attorney could
never agree to provide only drafting assistance and preliminary advice because she could always be
forced to appear in court and fully represent the pro se litigant as counsel of record.‖). For example,
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As stated above, attorneys generally enter an appearance by signing the
initial pleading filed on behalf of their client. 182 A court could conclude that
an attorney‘s disclosure on such a pleading that the attorney assisted the client
in or drafted the pleading for the client, even if the attorney had not signed the
pleading, constitutes a general appearance. Once an attorney enters an
appearance in the case, the attorney will need the court‘s consent to end the
representation, even if the representation was supposed to end with the
drafting of the pleading concerned. 183 Thus, the attorney‘s representation of
the client may not be limited in the manner initially contemplated by the
attorney and client when entering into the representation. 184 This could cause
attorneys to refrain from entering into discrete task representations because of
a fear that a court ultimately will require that they provide the full array of
legal services to the client concerned.
However, the more familiar that courts become with attorneys providing
unbundled legal services to clients, the less likely it seems that they would
require attorneys who have agreed to provide such services to engage in a
full-blown representation of the client concerned. If courts want pro se
litigants to receive some legal advice in order to increase the efficiency in
which the court can adjudicate their cases, courts should allow attorneys to
provide discrete legal services to litigants without being ―on the hook‖ for
representing the client throughout the entire case. 185 In fact, the more that
courts deal with this type of legal services arrangement, the more likely that

―a lawyer may be unable to represent a victim of domestic violence in an effort to secure a temporary
restraining order because the [court‘s] policies would require the lawyer to make a motion to
withdraw, and perhaps show good cause, to be excused from all other parts of the legal dispute.‖
ABA HEARING REPORT, supra note 5, at 6.
182. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
183. See Laremont-Lopez v. Se. Tidewater Opportunity Ctr., 968 F. Supp. 1075, 1079 (E.D.
Va. 1997) (―[O]nce an attorney has entered an appearance in a civil or criminal action, withdrawal is
permitted only by order of the court, and after reasonable notice to the party represented.‖); MODEL
RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.16(c) (2002) (stating that a ―lawyer must comply with applicable
law requiring notice to or permission of a tribunal when terminating a representation‖ and that
―[w]hen ordered to do so by a tribunal, a lawyer shall continue representation notwithstanding good
cause for terminating the representation.‖); see also Farley, supra note 181, at 570 (―In many
jurisdictions, attorneys must obtain permission from the court before withdrawing from a case.‖).
184. See Goldschmidt, supra note 25, at 1165 (―This raises the question of whether an attorney
subject to the candor-to-the-tribunal duties can then be compelled to enter an appearance and
involuntarily provide legal services beyond those provided for in the scope-of-the-representation
agreement.‖); Rothermich, supra note 5, at 2725 (―If the practice of ghostwriting itself constitutes an
appearance as attorney of record simply because it engenders an attorney-client relationship, [the
contemplated limited representation] would be rendered impossible by definition.‖).
185. See Farley, supra note 181, at 571 (―Proponents of limited appearances argue it is more
efficient for the court and fair for litigants to have attorneys actually argue on behalf of low-income,
unrepresented litigants in court proceedings.‖).
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they will develop special procedural rules to accommodate such legal
representations.186
The second argument that some commentators have presented is that an
attorney‘s disclosure of the legal services that the attorney has provided to the
nominal pro se litigant would violate the attorney‘s duty of confidentiality to
the client and the attorney-client privilege. 187 While an attorney‘s duty of
confidentiality might encompass the fact of his or her representation of a
client if a client did not wish to have this revealed,188 generally an attorney has
the option of disclosing confidential information if disclosure is necessary to
prevent a fraud and the client has used the attorney‘s services in furtherance
of the fraud.189 Assuming that courts cannot easily discern exactly when
attorneys have drafted documents for pro se litigants, which the language of
several court opinions indicates, 190 an attorney can disclose the fact of his or
her having provided legal services to the nominal pro se litigant in order to
prevent the other party from being disadvantaged by the court inappropriately
applying a liberal interpretation to the court documents concerned and being
more forgiving in the nominal pro se party‘s adherence to the court‘s
procedural rules. Additionally, the Model Rules expressly require an attorney
to disclose confidential information in order to avoid committing a fraud
against the court.191

186. See infra notes 212–22 and accompanying text (setting out rules that some courts have
developed to deal with otherwise pro se litigants who enter into discrete representation arrangements
with attorneys).
187. See Goldschmidt, supra note 25, at 1167, 1199 (asserting that ―American lawyers have a
duty of confidentiality that protects against compelled disclosure‖ and that ―[i]f a pro se party desires
that the details of his attorney-client relationship be kept confidential, the order to disclose the
ghostwriter and the terms of the representation agreement would be an unprecedented violation of the
attorney-client privilege‖).
188. See MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2003) (stating that ―[a] lawyer shall
not reveal information relating to the representation of a client unless the client gives informed
consent‖).
189. See MODEL RULES OF P ROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(2) (2003) (stating that ―[a] lawyer may
reveal [client confidential] information relating to the representation of a client to the extent the
lawyer reasonably believes necessary . . . to prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud that
is reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the financial interests or property of another and
in furtherance of which the client has used or is using the lawyer‘s services‖).
190. See supra notes 63–65 and accompanying text.
191. See MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 3.3(c) (2002) (stating that ―[t]he duties in
stated paragraphs (a) and (b) . . . apply even if compliance requires disclosure of information
otherwise protected by Rule 1.6,‖ dealing with an attorney‘s duty to not disclose client confidential
information); see also supra notes 30–32 and accompanying text (explaining the prohibition under
Model Rule 3.3(a) against an attorney making misrepresentations to a court and the requirement
under Model Rule 3.3(b) of taking ―reasonable remedial measures, including, if necessary disclosure
to the tribunal‖ to prevent or remedy ―fraudulent conduct [of other persons] related to the
proceeding‖).
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Furthermore, the attorney-client privilege normally does not cover the fact
that an attorney represents a client. 192 This results because this information
does not involve a communication between an attorney and client. 193 The
only exception to this rule is if the revelation of the fact that the attorney
represented the client would somehow ―reveal the content of a confidential
communication,‖ either ―directly or by reasonable inference.‖ 194 Usually, this
exception applies only when the revelation of the identity of the attorney‘s
client will result in identifying the client as having been involved in some
criminal endeavor.195

192. See, e.g., United States v. Legal Servs. for N.Y. City, 249 F.3d 1077, 1081 (D.C. Cir.
2001) (―Courts have consistently held that the general subject matters of clients‘ representations are
not privileged.‖); In re Grand Jury Matter No. 91-01386, 969 F.2d 995, 997 (11th Cir. 1992) (―The
identity of a client and the receipt of attorney‘s fees normally are not privileged matters.‖); Dietz v.
Doe, 935 P.2d 611, 617 (Wash. 1997) (―Ordinarily, the name of a client is not a confidential
communication under the protection of the attorney-client privilege.‖); People v. Adam, 280 N.E.2d
205, 207–08 (Ill. 1972) (concluding that the attorney-client privilege did not apply to testimony by
the client that the client retained an attorney and identifying that attorney ―because the privilege
applies only to communications made by [the client] to [her attorney]‖); see also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 69 cmt. g (2000) (―Courts have sometimes asserted
that the attorney-client privilege categorically does not apply to such matters as . . . the fact that the
client consulted the lawyer and the general subject matter of the consultation.‖).
193. See Legal Servs. for N.Y. City, 249 F.3d at 1081 (―Nor does the general purpose of a
client‘s representation necessarily divulge a confidential professional communication, and therefore
that data is not generally privileged.‖); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS
§ 69 cmt. g (2000) (stating that ―[t]estimony about such matters‖ as, among other things, ―the fact
that the client consulted the lawyer and the general subject matter of the consultation‖ usually ―does
not reveal the content of communications from the client‖); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 68(1) (2000) (requiring, among other things, a ―communication‖ for
the attorney-client privilege to apply). The Restatement defines a ―communication‖ to be ―any
expression through which a privileged person . . . undertakes to convey information to another
privileged person.‖ RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 69 (2000).
194. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 69 cmt. g (2000); see also
In re Grand Jury Matter, 969 F.2d at 997 (stating that an exception to the rule generally not
protecting the identity of a client under the attorney-client privilege exists ―where disclosure of the
identity would also reveal the privileged motive for the client to seek legal advice‖) (quoting In re
Grand Jury Proceedings 88-9, 899 F.2d 1039, 1043 (11th Cir. 1990)).
195. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Matter, 969 F.2d at 997 (―[Under] the ‗last link‘
doctrine . . . the identity of the client may become privileged because it ‗may well be the link that
could form the chain of testimony necessary to convict the individual of a federal crime.‘‖) (quoting
Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623, 633 (9th Cir. 1960)); United States v. Legal Servs. for N.Y. City,
100 F. Supp. 2d 42, 45 (D.D.C. 2000) (―Some courts . . . have recognized an ‗extremely narrow‘
exception to this rule, when disclosure would implicate the client in criminal wron gdoing, or when
disclosure, in conjunction with information already provided, would be tantamount to revealing an
‗indubitably confidential communication[ ].‘‖) (quoting In re Witnesses Before the Special March
1980 Grand Jury, 729 F.2d 489, 493 (7th Cir. 1984)), aff’d, 249 F.3d 1077 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Dietz,
935 P.2d at 617 (―[T]he ‗legal advice‘ exception . . . ‗which bars disclosure ―where the person
invoking the privilege can show that a strong probability exists that disclosure of such information
would implicate that client in the very criminal activity for which legal advice was sought.‖‘‖)
(quoting Seventh Elect Church in Israel v. Rogers, 688 P.2d 506, 509 (Wash. 1984)).
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However, this exception does not apply to disclosure of attorney
ghostwriting. Revealing the fact that a nominal pro se client received legal
assistance in preparing his or her pleadings by itself would not reveal any
other privileged communication between the client and his or her attorney.
Neither would this disclosure necessarily identify the client‘s involvement in
some potential criminal endeavor for which the client originally sought the
advice of the attorney. Even if this information somehow would lead to the
revelation of some other privileged communication, the attorney-client
privilege, similar to an attorney‘s ethical duty of confidentiality, does not
apply to communications in which the client ―uses the lawyer‘s advice or
other services to engage in or assist a crime or fraud.‖196 Therefore, because
the attorney‘s failure to disclose the assistance provided to the nominal pro se
client arguably constitutes a fraud on the court, if not also on the opposing
party, the attorney-client privilege would not cover the fact of the attorney‘s
representation even under this scenario. Thus, neither the attorney-client
privilege nor an attorney‘s broader ethical duty of confidentiality to a client
provides a justification for attorneys to fail to disclose that they drafted court
documents for, or provided other legal assistance to, litigants presenting
themselves to the court as proceeding pro se.
V. RECOMMENDATION TO REQUIRE DISCLOSURE OF GHOSTWRITING AND
CONSIDER GHOSTWRITING TO CONSTITUTE A LIMITED APPEARANCE BY AN
ATTORNEY
In order to allow for the courts to fairly and efficiently adjudicate cases
involving nominal pro se litigants, courts should require attorneys to disclose
their conduct when they ghostwrite court documents for litigants otherwise
proceeding pro se or provide some other limited legal services to such
litigants. Requiring ghostwriting attorneys to make such a disclosure would
prevent courts from continuing to be liberal in interpreting the document
concerned, which an attorney in fact drafted, and forgiving in applying its
procedural rules to that document.197 Therefore, the nominal pro se litigant
would not obtain an unfair advantage against his or her opponent through the
attorney‘s limited provision of legal services.
As set out above, despite protestations to the contrary in a few ethics
opinions and by ghostwriting proponents, courts often have difficulty
determining whether an attorney has drafted a document for a pro se litigant
and are reluctant to conclude that attorney ghostwriting has occurred unless
196. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 82(b) (2000).
197. See supra notes 57–62 and accompanying text (explaining the manner in which courts are
required to liberally interpret pro se litigants‘ court documents throughout the lawsuit as well as
giving pro se litigants considerable leeway in meeting procedural deadlines).
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someone with actual knowledge of the attorney‘s conduct affirmatively states
that such conduct actually has taken place. 198 Thus, although not as egregious
as bribing a judge or a juror, undetected ghostwriting does ―undermine[] the
integrity of the adjudicative process‖199 by giving an unfair advantage to the
nominal pro se litigant and does violate an attorney‘s duty to avoid
committing a fraud on the court,200 as well as the attorney‘s duties to avoid
fraud generally,201 to make truthful statements to third parties, and to avoid
assisting a client to commit fraud.202
Moreover, requiring disclosure of attorney ghostwriting of court
documents, as well as the provision of other unbundled legal services to
nominal pro se litigants, will allow an opposing party who was contemplating
proceeding pro se to hire an attorney if he or she is able and desires to do so
because that party will now be fully informed about the legal services that the
nominal pro se party has received. 203 If attorney ghostwriting is allowed to
occur without disclosure, this could encourage attorneys to provide more
extensive unbundled legal services to a nominal pro se litigant that could
severely prejudice an opposing party who actually is proceeding pro se.
For example, an attorney could engage in a more extensive ―stealth‖
representation where the attorney ghostwrites documents for the nominal pro
se litigant periodically throughout the lawsuit and even provides legal and
strategic advice to that party during settlement negotiations without the
knowledge of an opposing pro se party. An attorney might even appear on
behalf of the nominal pro se litigant at a hearing to argue an important motion
without the opposing party having any advance notice that the attorney would
so appear. In such situations, the opposing party is at a significant
disadvantage when he or she is legitimately proceeding pro se without any
legal assistance. Such ―stealth‖ legal representations also present some
additional and, perhaps, not immediately apparent thorny issues, such as
whether a ―stealth‖ attorney assisting the nominal pro se litigant with
analyzing the other side‘s discovery documents violates a protective order that
198. See supra notes 63–68 and accompanying text.
199. See MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmts. 2, 12 (2002).
200. See MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (2002); see also supra notes 29–36 and
accompanying text (discussing an attorney‘s duty of candor toward the court under Model Rule 3.3).
201. See MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 8.4(c) (2002); see also supra note 37 and
accompanying text (discussing an attorney‘s duty to avoid fraud generally under Model Rule 8.4(c)).
202. See MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 4.1, 1.2(d) (2002); see also supra notes 38–42
and accompanying text (discussing an attorney‘s duty to avoid making false statements to third
parties and assisting client fraud).
203. See CAL. COMM ‘N ON ACCESS TO JUSTICE, supra note 72. (―There should be a level
playing field for [an] opposing party in an unbundled situation. If one side had known the other side
had an attorney, instead of learning of it when, all of a sudden, an attorney appeared at a court
hearing, they might have brought one too.‖).
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a court has issued with regard to confidential documents that the opponent
produced. 204 Admittedly, such behavior goes beyond an attorney simply
ghostwriting an initial pleading for a party that otherwise proceeds pro se
through the rest of the lawsuit, but failing to require disclosure of attorney
ghostwriting potentially opens the door to more extensive abuses by stealth
counsel. Thus, the best manner of dealing with attorney ghostwriting in order
to prevent any unfair prejudice to the opposing party is to require the
disclosure of such activity.
Simply disclosing on the document concerned that counsel prepared it
would prevent courts from inappropriately applying a liberal interpretation to
the document concerned, and such disclosure would also prevent an opposing
party from deciding to proceed pro se without knowledge of the legal
assistance that the nominal pro se client was in fact receiving. However, this
limited disclosure would not provide the exact identity of the ghostwriting
attorney and, thus, would not sufficiently deal with the efficiency concern of
courts.205 Just knowing that some unnamed counsel prepared the document
will still require a court to engage in an investigation to discover the
attorney‘s identity should the court need to question the attorney about the
accuracy of the law or facts contained in the document concerned. 206 As
pointed out above, being able to follow up with the preparing attorney quickly
and efficiently is especially important in bankruptcy cases, an area in which
litigants often appear pro se and where the initial petitions filed with the court
often need to be amended in order to correct errors and omissions.207
On the other hand, when a court document indicates the name of the
attorney who drafted it for an otherwise pro se litigant, the court should not
consider the attorney to have entered a general appearance for the litigant
concerned and keep the attorney ―on the hook‖ for representing that litigant
further in the lawsuit.208 In fact, in order to prevent requiring attorney
204. See Norbert v. La. Med. Ctr., No. 05-1650, 2007 WL 1537021, at *2 (W.D. La. May 24,
2007) (granting defendant‘s motion to prevent stealth counsel of pro se plaintiff from viewing
defendant‘s sensitive personnel documents unless counsel made an official appearance in the case on
behalf of the pro se plaintiff).
205. See supra notes 77–83 and accompanying text (discussing the efficiency concerns that
courts have expressed about ghostwriting).
206. Beyond investigating some type of malfeasance on the part of either the pro se lit igant or
the ghostwriting attorney, the court might also need to contact the ghostwriting attorney if the court
perceives that the pro se litigant simply does not understand the legal arguments made in the
ghostwritten documents sufficiently. See Tebo, supra note 4, at 17 (discussing difficult ethics issues
that ghostwriting raises identified by James McCauley, ethics counsel for the Virginia State Bar).
207. See supra notes 78–80 and accompanying text.
208. See ABA HEARING REPORT, supra note 5, at 8 (―State ethics rules and rules of procedure
should be examined and, where necessary, modified to permit limited representation that can be
promoted and provided on a competitive, cost-effective basis. Specific issues include ghostwriting,
limited appearances, fee sharing and client development.‖).
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disclosure of ghostwriting from discouraging attorneys from providing
unbundled legal services, courts should consider such disclosure to constitute
only a limited appearance. Furthermore, courts should contact ghostwriting
attorneys who reveal their identities only when the court determines that some
type of problem exists with the document concerned, such as some type of
inaccuracy or when the court suspects malfeasance.
Therefore, it would be appropriate for attorneys who ghostwrite
documents for litigants just to indicate their names on the documents
concerned in some manner other than actually signing the documents
concerned. As set out above, such disclosure would not violate an attorney‘s
duty of confidentiality to a client because the disclosure would be made in
order to prevent a misrepresentation to the court and opposing counsel. 209
Similarly, such a disclosure would not breach the attorney-client privilege
because the privilege does not cover the fact of the attorney‘s representation
of the client concerned. 210 However, if the attorney actually signs the
document, this could constitute a general appearance.211 Instead, the litigant
should sign the document, and the attorney should just note in another spot
that counsel prepared the document along with counsel‘s name and contact
information.
Moreover, in order to encourage attorneys, despite the disclosure
requirement, to provide unbundled legal services to litigants who otherwise
would proceed entirely pro se, courts should develop explicit procedures that
govern the manner in which attorneys make such disclosure and that explicitly
state that an attorney making such a disclosure does not enter a general
appearance on behalf of the client. Courts that deal with areas in which pro se
litigants are especially prevalent, such as domestic relations, housing, and
bankruptcy courts, should especially consider developing such rules.
Alternatively, states could revise their legal ethics rules so that they
expressly require disclosure of attorney ghostwriting of court documents and
state that such disclosure constitutes only a limited appearance in the litigation
concerned. Whether courts‘ local rules or states‘ professional responsibility
rules are changed in this manner, the result would be the same—attorneys
could provide limited legal services to litigants otherwise proceeding pro se in
an open and honest fashion, and the contemplated disclosure would not serve
as a disincentive to the provision of such unbundled services. However,
revision of states‘ legal ethics codes would probably accomplish this in a
quicker and more widespread manner.
209. See supra notes 188–91 and accompanying text.
210. See supra notes 192–95 and accompanying text.
211. See supra notes 87–88, 181–82 and accompanying text (discussing the effect of an
attorney‘s signature on initial pleadings).
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A few courts have already developed rules to accommodate the disclosure
of attorneys having provided limited legal assistance to otherwise pro se
litigants and that designate that such disclosure constitutes only a limited
appearance by the attorney concerned. For example, the rules of procedure
for Florida family law courts require that an attorney disclose his or her
identity on ―[a]ny pleading or other document filed by a limited appearance
attorney.‖212 Furthermore, these rules require that ―[a] party who files a
pleading or other document of record pro se with the assistance of an attorney
shall certify that the party has received assistance from an attorney in the
preparation of the pleading or other document.‖ 213 Florida‘s rules also allow
for limited appearances by attorneys providing unbundled legal services for a
client.214 Such attorneys must file ―a notice, signed by the party, specifically
limiting the attorney‘s appearance only to the particular proceeding or matter
in which the attorney appears.‖215 Then, ―[a]t the conclusion of such
proceeding or matter, the attorney‘s role terminates without the necessity of
leave of court, upon the attorney filing notice of completion of limited
appearance.‖216 The filing of such notices at the beginning and end of the
limited representation, as well as serving these notices on the other party or
the party‘s counsel when applicable, should prevent any confusion on the part
of the court or the other party as to when they should communicate with the
nominal pro se litigant or with the litigant‘s attorney regarding a matter.217
Similarly, Colorado has amended its rules of civil procedure to
accommodate the provision of unbundled legal services. Under Colorado‘s
new Rule 11, attorneys who provide ―drafting assistance‖ to parties who file
documents with a Colorado court as pro se must ―include the attorney‘s name,
address, telephone number and registration number‖ on the document
concerned. 218 The attorney also must ―advise the pro se party that such
pleading or other paper must contain this statement.‖219 Furthermore, ―[i]n

212. FLA. FAM. LAW R. P. 12.040(e) (2007). But see CAL. R. CT. FAM. R. 5.70 (2007) (―In a
family law proceeding, an attorney who contracts with a client to draft or assist in drafting legal
documents, but not to make an appearance in the case, is not required to disclose within the text of
the document that he or she was involved in preparing the documents.‖).
213. FLA. FAM. LAW R. P. 12.040(d) (2007).
214. FLA. FAM. LAW R. P. 12.040(a) (2007); see also FLA. FAM. LAW R. P. 12.040(c) (2007)
(―If an attorney appears of record for a particular limited proceeding or matter, as provided by this
rule, that attorney shall be deemed ‗of record‘ for only that particular proceeding or matter.‖).
215. FLA. FAM. LAW R. P. 12.040(a).
216. FLA. FAM. LAW R. P. 12.040(c).
217. See Farley, supra note 181, at 576–77 (discussing how the filing of notices and developing
rules regarding when opposing counsel must contact the attorney providing limited legal services can
prevent opposing counsel from improperly contacting the otherwise pro se litigant).
218. COLO. R. CIV. P. 11(b) (2008).
219. Id.
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helping to draft the pleading or paper filed by the pro se party,‖ the attorney
makes certifications to the court concerning the facts and law on which the
document is based similar to those that the attorney would make if he or she
actually had signed the document. 220 Moreover, the rule explicitly states that
―[l]imited representation of a pro se party under this Rule 11(b) shall not
constitute an entry of appearance by the attorney‖ for the purpose of
Colorado‘s rules governing appearances before Colorado courts and
withdrawal. 221
Courts in Maine, Nevada, Washington, and Wyoming have enacted
comparable appearance rules dealing with unbundled representation of
litigants otherwise proceeding pro se. 222 Therefore, a handful of courts have
already taken steps to require disclosure of attorney ghostwriting of court
documents for otherwise pro se litigants and ensure that such disclosure does
not constitute a general appearance in the case from which the attorney will
need court approval to withdraw. However, many more jurisdictions should
follow the lead of these courts and enact similar court or ethics rules requiring
disclosure of the identity of attorneys who ghostwrite documents for litigants
who otherwise proceed pro se and enabling this disclosure to constitute only a
limited appearance by the ghostwriting attorney.

220. Id. (―In helping to draft the pleading and paper filed by the pro se party, the attorney
certifies that, to the best of the attorney‘s knowledge, information and belief, this pleading or paper is
(1) well-grounded in fact based upon a reasonable inquiry of the pro se party by the attorney, (2) is
warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification or reversal of
existing law, and (3) is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause
unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.‖); see also WASH. SUPER. CT. CIV. R.
11(b) (2006) (imposing similar certification requirements for attorneys who ―help[ed] to draft a
pleading, motion or document filed by the otherwise self-represented person‖).
221. COLO. R. CIV. P. 11(b) (2008).
222. See ME. CODE OF PROF‘L RESPONSIBILITY R. 3.4(i) (2002) (―If, after consultation, the
client consents in writing (the general form of which is attached to these Rules), an attorney may
enter a limited appearance on behalf of an otherwise unrepresented party involved in a court
proceeding.‖); NEV. 8TH JUD. DIST. R. PRACT. 5.28 (2006) (requiring that an ―attorney who contracts
with a client to limit the scope of representation‖ to ―state that limitation in the first paragraph of the
first paper or pleading filed on behalf of that client‖ and stating that ―[a]n attorney who contracts
with a client to limit the scope of representation shall be permitted to withdraw from [the]
representation before the court by filing a Substitution of Attorney‖ that indicates that the ―service
has been completed‖ and ―that the client will be representing himself or herself in proper person‖ and
includes ―a copy of the limited services retainer agreement between the attorney and the client‖);
WASH. SUPER. CT. CIV. R. 4.2(b) (2008) (―Providing limited representation of a person under these
rules shall not constitute an entry of appearance by the attorney . . . .‖); WYO. UNIF. R. DIST. CTS.
102(a)(1)(B) (2002) (―[A]n attorney who assisted in the preparation of a pleading and whose name
appears on the pleading as having done so shall not be deemed to have entered an appearance in the
matter . . . .‖).
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VI. CONCLUSION
Pro se litigants are a fact of life in state and federal courts today,
especially in courts dealing with certain subject matter such as bankruptcy,
housing, and family law. Therefore, attorneys should be encouraged to
provide unbundled legal services, including drafting of initial pleadings or
other court documents, to such litigants who desire to receive these services
and can afford them. However, the provision of unbundled legal services to
litigants who otherwise proceed pro se should not be encouraged at the
expense of the opposing party, who is entitled to a fair and impartial
adjudication as well as full disclosure regarding the legal services that the
nominal pro se party actually is receiving. Moreover, attorneys should not
engage in a misrepresentation to the court, as well as to the opposing party, by
engaging in undisclosed ghostwriting of documents.
Therefore, states should develop either ethics or court rules that explicitly
require attorneys to disclose their identities when they draft court documents
for parties otherwise proceeding pro se. At the same time, courts should not
consider such disclosures to constitute a general appearance, which would
require court approval before the attorney is allowed to withdraw from the
representation. Instead, courts should consider such a disclosure to constitute
a limited appearance, if it is considered to be any type of appearance at all. A
few courts have already adopted rules doing this, but many more courts and
jurisdictions still need to do so. Only in this manner can courts and the bar
promote the provision of unbundled legal services to otherwise pro se litigants
while requiring disclosure of attorney ghostwriting to allow for the fair and
efficient adjudication of the lawsuit involved.

